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SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
IN A CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT:
THE FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION CASES
Charles F. Abernathy*

Sovereign immunity: the term sounds curious in a nation that is
beginning to celebrate the bicentennial of its independence from the
British sovereign George III. Very early in our history we took steps
to insure that the.rule of law, as expressed in the Constitution, would
prevail over the mortals who run our government.• Yet even as the
concepts of rule of law and judicial review came into ascendancy, we
also harbored the sovereign immunity doctrine as a restraint on
judicial power and as an apparent repudiation of the rule of law.
Indeed, in its most extreme form the doctrine has come to stand for
judicial incapacity to redress governmental action that is known to
be unconstitutional. 2
The inherent antagonism between the rule of law and the
sovereign immunity doctrine has produced much mischief in our
courts, some of which will be considered in this Article. On its face,
the very notion of judicial power versus "sovereign" power is an
anomaly in our three-part plan of national government: the judicial
branch created by article III is just as much a part of our government
as the executive and legislative branches. 3 In fact, "sovereign"
immunity is a misnomer; for the doctrine applies only to prevent

* Counsel, Southern Poverty Law Center, Montgomery, Ala.; Assistant
Professor, Georgetown Univ. Law Center (beginning in Sept., 1975). A.B. Harvard,
1969; J.D. 1973 .. The author represented the plaintiffs in Penn v. Schlesinger, which is
discussed in this Article.
1 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. {I Cranch) 137 (1803). For modern analogues,
see United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
1
See, e.g., Edelman v, Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); Kawananakoa v. Polyblank,
205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907); cf. Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337
U.S. 682, 708 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
J U.S. CONST. arts. I, II, III. The word "sovereign" appears nowhere in the
Constitution, not even in the eleventh amendment, which was passed to restore
sovereign immunity for the states. Seep. 330 infra.

1975]

Sovereign Immunity

323

suits against the executive and legislative branches; the Court has
developed a separate "judicial" immunity to prevent certain suits
against persons within the judicial branch. 4
Cast in this light, sovereign immunity becomes not a mystical
question of sovereign power but a practical issue of the powers and
immunities of the separate branches of government. Indeed, this
Article will argue that the sovereign immunity doctrine is not
anticonstitutional, but rather reflects the Constitution's allocation of
power among the three branches of government. The Court's
development of sovereign immunity principles, as we shall see,
implicitly recognizes this separation of powers rationale.
In exploring this rationale for sovereign immunity, this Article
will assume a dual personality. Section I is devoted to an intensive
consideration of one area of the law-employment discrimination
suits against federal officers-where application of the sovereign
immunity doctrine has generated considerable confusion and
attehdant injustice. A conventional analysis will show how the
Sup-reme Court developed certain basic rules of sovereign immunity
law, how the courts of appeals have applied these rules generally, and
how the rules came to be misapplied by several courts in employment
discrimination cases. The analysis in the first Section will also lay the
essential case law groundwork for the more general considerations
discussed in the latter two-thirds of the Article.
Sections II and III will develop the separation of powers
rationale for sovereign immunity, showing how the immunity
principles adopted by the Supreme Court implicitly define the
decisionmaking powers of the separate branches. Section II will show
how sovereign immunity considerations can enter a lawsuit at two
distint stages-in the initial pleadings and at the relief phase of the
case. Section III will show how separation of powers considerations
work at each of these two stages to allocate constitutional power to
one branch or another. First, it discusses the traditional sovereign
immunity rules that have been applied at the pleading stage and
shows how they reflect separation of powers notions. Then it
suggests that these same notions produce fair and effective results at
the relief stage of the inquiry, the stage where courts are just now
• See Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871) Uudicial immunity); Yaselli
v. Goff, 12 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1926), affd mem., 215 U.S. 503 (1927) (court officers); cf
Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-54 (1967). See generally P. Bator, P. Mishkin, D.
Shapiro, & H. Wechsler, HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL ·sYSTEM 1410-23 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as HART &
WECHSLER].
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trying to fashion some coherent rationale for their decisions. A final
part of Section III will bring the paper full circle. It will illustrate how
the separation of powers rationale works by applying it to some of
the difficult problems of relief in the area of federal employment
discrimination.
I. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND FEDERAL
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
A black person in Alabama has a greater chance of getting a job
with George Wallace's state government than with the federal
government. With blacks making up over 25 percent of the state
population, only seven percent of state employees are black; 5 in
comparison, only six percent of federal employees in Alabama are
black. 6 Indeed, the federal government's performance in Alabama is
so notorious that state agencies accused of racist employment
practices have begun to defend themselves in court by showing that
they are less discriminatory than the federal government.' Nor is the
federal government's record in Alabama very unusual. While the
federal agencies' employment figures do not so blatantly scream
discrimination elsewhere in the nation, 8 there is reason to believe that
the United States government is not the equal opportunity employer
that most of us thought it to be. 9
'Complaint ,-r 42, Penn v. United States, 350 F. Supp. 752 (M.D. Ala. 1972),
affd, 490 F.2d 700, rev'd on other grounds, 497 F.2d 970 (5th Cir. 1974) (en bane). The
hiring and promotion practices of Alabama's departments and agencies have been
found to be racially discriminatory and are now under court supervision. See NAACP
v. Allen, 493 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1974), affg 340 F. Supp. 703 (M.D. Ala. 1972); United
States v. Frazer, 317 F. Supp. 1079 (M.D. Ala. 1970).
• U.S. Civil Serv. Comm'n, Minority Group Employment in the Government,
Doc. #SM 70-70B, Nov. 30, 1970 [hereinafter cited as Minority Group Employment].
If the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and Veterans Administration are
excluded, the federal government's figure for black employment drops to 2.5 percent.
Such statistics may be used in employment suits to prove a prima facie case of
discrimination. See Comment, Race Quotas, 8 HARV. CIV. RIGHTS-CIV. LIB. L.
REV. 128, 131-35 (1973).
'See NAACP v. Allen, 340 F. Supp. 703, 709 n.6 (M.D. Ala. 1972), affd, 493
F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1974).
' See R. Rittenoure, BLACK EMPLOYMENT IN THE SOUTH: THE CASE
OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 1-2, 138-66 (1972). The author concludes that
blacks are generally underrepresented in federal employment in the southern states.
Though adequately represented in the federal workforce outside the south, however,
black employees are confined to the lower wage schedules. /d. at 1-2.
• See id. at 1-2, 138-66; Minority Group Employment, supra note 6, passim.
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The responsibility for this dismal record can be laid directly to
the inadequacy of internal administrative complaint procedures 10 and
the ineffectiveness of the government's internal policing effort at
both the agency 11 and appellate level. 12 In light of the difficulties of
•• A congressional committee concluded in 1971 that the "disproportionatte [sic]
distribution of minorities and women throughout the federal bureaucracy and their
exclusion from higher level policy-making and supervisory positions indicates the
government's failure to pursue its policy of equal opportunity.
"A critical defect of the Federal equal employment program has been the failure
of the complaint process. That process has impeded rather than advanced the goal of
elimination of discrimination in Federal employment." H.R. Rep. No. 238, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess., 23-24 (1971).
The grievance procedures are a model of bureaucratic obstructionism and delay.
As originally designed, the regulations required that an aggrieved employee first
approach a designated Equal Employment Qpportunity (EEO) Counselor within his
agency or branch. The EEO Counselor was authorized to attempt to settle the
grievance informally, but should that fail, he was required to advise the employee of
the employee's right to file a formal, written complaint with an EEO officer. 5 C.F.R.
§§ 713.213-.214 (1971). A hearing followed, and if the employee was dissatisfied with
the initial results, he faced another series of appellate reviews, both within the agency
and later with the Civil Service Commission. 5 C.F.R. § 713.215 (1971).
These regulations were amended in 1972. 37 Fed. Reg. 22717 (1972). The
regulations now in effect do not differ substantially from the original except that, in
obedience to the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16
(Supp. III, 1973), agencies are now required to resolve a complaint within 180 days of
its filing. 5 C.F.R. § 713.220 (1974).
" Agency enforcement consists largely of paper guarantees of fairness
unsupported by· any concern for their implementation. Although the regulations
require that agency counsellors advise the aggrieved employee of his administrative
rights, 5 C.F.R. § 713.213(a) (1974), this is not always done. See Penn v. United States,
350 F. Supp. 752 (M.D. Ala. 1972), affd, 490 F.2d 700, rev'd on other grounds, 491 F.
2d 970 (5th Cir. 1974) (en bane). Moreover, enforcement personnel are put in a weak
and contradictory position in relation to those whom they should police since strict
enforcement might disrupt the agency and thJls bring retribution from above.
12
Dissatisfied employees may carry their appeals to the Civil Service Commission, where institutional forces also work against vigorous resolution of employee
complaints. As a recent Public Interest Research Group study reports, the
Commission suffers from a conflict of interest because most of its activities concern
provision of management advice and support services to agency supervisors, a duty
inherently incompatible with its oversight and review duties in the area of employee
rights. R. Vaughn, THE SPOILED SYSTEM 11-55 (1972). Close contact with agency
heads in providing management support creates at least the appearance of partiality in
deciding employee complaints, an appearance reinforced by the Commission's
practice of permitting direct ex parte contact between hearing examiners and agency
heads concerning some employee appeals. ld. at Il-58, II-64. Even Civil Service
Commission Chairman Robert Hampton remarked in 1972 that the assignment of an
employee appeal function to his management oriented commission was "an
anomaly." ld. at II-65.
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obtaining relief through administrative procedures, the key to
enforcing equal employment opportunities in the federal government
must be the right to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts to
ensure that discriminatory practices are ended. For over a decade,
executive orders have banned invidious discrimination in federal employment, 13 and Congress has declared that such discrimination is
against federal policy. 14 But more is at stake than just these policy
statements-the policy is grounded in the anti-discrimination
provisions of the Constitution itself. 15 Thus the courts, in their role as
protectors of individual constitutional rights, 16 are brought into the
fray.
Yet S!!Veral federal courts of appeals, covering states where
11 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 11478, 34 Fed. Reg. 12985 (1969), as amended by
Exec. Order No. 11590, 36 Fed. Reg. 7831 (1971).
"5 U.S.C. § 7151 (1970) provides: "It is the policy of the United States to insure
equal employment opportunities for employees without discrimination because of
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."
15
Early cases sometimes noted that the Constitution contained no equal
protection clause applicable to the federal government as the fourteenth amendment's
clause applied to the states. See, e.g., LaBelle Iron Works v. United States, 256 U.S.
377, 392 (1921). Yet over the last quarter-century the Supreme Court has found such
nondiscrimination principles to be implicit in our governmental system. Racial
discrimination was declared by the Court to be against federal public policy in Hurd v.
Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948), and the ban on federal racial discrimination has since 1954
been read into the fifth amendment's due process clause. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347
U.S. 497 (1954). While Bolling and later cases used language that suggested that
perhaps only egregious cases of discrimination were covered by the fifth amendment's
due process clause, see, e.g., Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 168 (1964) (discrimination "so unjustifiable" as to violate due process covered), in practice the
Court's mode of analysis has been identical in both federal and state discrimination
cases. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 641-42 (1969) (claims arising in
the District of Columbia under the due process clause and in several states subject to
the equal protection clause disposed of in same manner). Compare Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), with Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). Even the
arguably limiting language has been dropped in recent cases. See, e.g., Jimenez v.
Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 637 (1974). See also Jackson v. Statler Foundation, 496
F.2d 623,635 (2d Cir. 1974). The antidiscrimination principles of the fifth amendment
apply to the full range of federal governmental activities, including employment
discrimination by federal departments and agencies. See Schlesinger v. Ballard, 95 S.
Ct. 572 (1975); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551-55 (1974); Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). (The type of discrimination at issue, e.g., sex, race,
would relate only to the standard of court review, just as in state equal protection
cases, and not to the issue of coverage itself. See Frontiero v. Richardson, supra, at
682.)
16 See note 29 infra.
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federal employment discrimination is greatest, 17 have held that
sovereign immunity prevented them from banning employment
discrimination by federal officials. The first such case, Gnotta v.
United States, 18 was a suit by a federal civil service employee who
claimed that his immediate supervisor had denied him advancement
and supplemental job training because of his Italian ancestry. Such
discrimination based on alienage is patently unconstitutional, 19 but in
an opinie;n written by Judge (now Justice) Blackmun, an Eighth
Circuit panel ruled that Gnotta's suit was barred by the doctrine of
sovereign immunity. Fifth20 and Sixth21 Circuit cases have followed
this position and have applied the doctrine to bar suits in which black
federal employees claimed that they had been fired or denied
promotion solely on the basis of their race. While recent decisions
from the Fifth22 and Ninth Circuits23 have tried to open the door to at
least partial relief, they leave much of the immunity defense intact. 24
More importantly, even these modifications of the Gnotta position
show a continuing misunderstanding of the immunity doctrine, a
misunderstanding that perpetuates confusion and injustice.
The impact of the sovereign immunity defense continues to be
felt in the federal employment sector despite the passage of the 1972
Equal Employment Opportunity Act, which waives the sovereign
immunity defense in part.25 Many claims only now being litigated
arose before the Act's effective date/6 and, more importantly, the
17
Cf. note 8 supra. The major southern states lie in the following circuits: Fourth
(Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina), Fifth (Georgia, Florida, Alabama,
Mississippi, Louisiana, Texas), Sixth (Tennessee, and border state Kentucky), and
Eighth (Arkansas and border state Missouri). The case developments discussed in this
Article have reached each of these circuits except the Fourth.
"415 F.2d 1271 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 934 (1970).
"See Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S.
356 (1886); cf. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (l943)(holding the same
rule to apply to the United States as to a state).
20
Blaze v. Moon, 440 F.2d 1348 (5th Cir. 1971).
21
Bramblett v. Desobry, 490 F.2d 405 (6th Cir. ), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 133 (1974);
Ogletree v. McNamara, 449 F.2d 93 (6th Cir. 1971). See Place v. Weinberger, 497 F.2d
412 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 526 (1974) (sex discrimination).
22
Beale v. Blount, 461 F.2d 1133 (5th Cir. 1972).
" Bowers v. Campbell, 505 F.2d 1155 (9th Cir. 1974). The court relied upon the
Fifth Circuit decision in Beale v. Blount, 461 F.2d 1133 (5th Cir. 1972).
" ~ee pp. 341-43 infra.
"42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l6(c) (Supp. III, 1973).
"See, e.g., Bowers v. Campbell, 505 F.2d 1155 (9th Cir. 1974); Place v.
Weinberger, 497 F.2d 412 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 526 (1974); Bramblett v.
Desobry, 490 F.2d 405 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 133 (1974). The latter two cases
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1972 Act does not waive immunity for all agencies and departments 27
nor does it cover all types of discrimination. 28 Thus, many federal
employment suits will be brought without benefit of the partial
statutory waiver of immunity, and plaintiffs in these cases must
depend for the success of their claims29 upon court reversal of the
Gnotta-type precedents.
Nor does the impact of Gnotta stop with employment cases or
federal defendants. The sovereign immunity doctrine can be applied
held that the 1972 Equal Employment Opportunity Act is not retroactive, thus leaving
in place for a time the sovereign immunity bar that the Sixth Circuit had adopted
before the act's passage. See Ogletree v. McNamara, 449 F.2d 93 (6th'Cir. 1971). The
Fourth Circuit, however, has granted some relief to plaintiffs whose claims predated
the waiver statute, ruling that the statute applies retroactively to cover at least those
claims that were already in the administrative complaint process on the effective date
of the 1972 Act. See Koger v. Ball, 497 F.2d 702 (4th Cir. 1974).
17
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a) (Supp. III, 1973).
1
' Only certain kinds of discrimination are prohibited; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a)
(Supp. Ill, 1973) (race, color, religion, sex, national origin). While the areas in which
immunity is waived cover most traditional bases for discrimination, some currently
important bases that might be unconstitutional are not named, e.g., alien status, see
Mow Sun Wong v. Hampton, 500 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 417 U.S.
944 (1974); marital status, compare United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413
U.S. 528 (1973), with Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. I (1974); Indian tribal
status, see Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974); illegitimacy, cf Jimenez v.
Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974); and sexual orientation and status related to sex (e.g.,
pregnancy), cf. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484,496 n.20 (1974).
19
The question may arise whether claims pursued outside the Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1972 state a cause of action since that statute not only waives
sovereign immunity in part but also specifically provides a cause of action for the
aggrieved employee. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) (Supp. III, 1973). This issue,
however, presents no real problem, as causes of action for unconstitutional
deprivations are implied directly from the Constititution itself, at least where
injunctive relief is the remedy sought. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of
the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 398 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring);
Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278 (1913). The rule is also
implicit in City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507 (1973), where the Court found no
cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) and consequently no jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1970). Rather than dismiss the complaint, the Court remanded
for a determination of whether jurisdiction existed under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970), id.
at 515, a remand that would have been fruitless unless the Court considered there to be
an independent cause of action stated directly under the Constitution. See The
Supreme Court: 1972 Term. 87 HARV. L. REV. 252,261-62 & nn. 53,55 (1973).
Plaintiffs claiming racial discrimination can also base their cause of action on the
statutory authority of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970). See note 121 infra. See
Bowers v, Campbell, 505 F.2d 1155 (9th Cir. 1974); Penn v. Schlesinger, 490 F.2d 700,
rev'd 011 other grou11ds, 497 F.2d 970 (5th Cir. 1974) (en bane); cf. District of Columbia
v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 422 (1973) (involving§ 1982, companion provision to§ 1981,
and holding federal action covered).
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by analogy to suits in any subject matter area, 30 and since
government attorneys as a matter of course plead sovereign
immunity in almost every case against federal officials/ 1 there is
every opportunity for the doctrine to creep into the full range of such
suits.32 Moreover, because the doctrine of sovereign immunity is
applied identically to the states and the federal government/3 the
Gnotta ruling could apply with equal vigor to state action which
violated constitutional commands.34
With these implications in mind, we can now turn to a brief
review of the historical development of federal sovereign immunity
doctrine to provide a basis for analyzing the doctrine in the
employment discrimination context.

A. Rise and Restriction of Sovereign Immunity Doctrine
1. Supreme Court Development of the Doctrine and its Exceptions
Sovereign immunity doctrine has been a source of much legal
controversy. 3s Often regarded as part of our English legal heritage/ 6
"'For example, in Blaze v. Moon, 440 F.2d 1348 (5th Cir. 1971}, the court
suggested that even Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), which mandated school
integration in the District of Columbia, would have been decided contrarily had the
Court considered the sovereign immunity issue.
"See Cramton, Nonstatutory Review of Federal Administrative Action: The Need
for Statutory Reform of Sovereign Immunity, Subject Matter Jurisdiction, and Parties
Defendant, 68 MICH. L. REV. 387,420 n.152 (1970).
" See pp. 335-36 infra.
33
U.S. CONST. amend XI. But see pp. 331-32 infra.
"Cf Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974) (holding a federal court's award of
retroactive welfare benefits barred by the eleventh amendment). One recent certiorari
petition has claimed that a federal court's affirmative order of injunctive relief against
defendant state officials violates the eleventh amendment. Petition for Certiorari,
Crisler v. Morrow, No. 73-1838, 43 U.S.L.\V. 3054 (U.S. Aug. 13, 1974), petitioning
for cert. to 491 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir. 1974).
>s Commentators have often complained of the injustices the doctrine produces
and argued for legislative abolition. See, e.g., Laski, The Responsibility of the State in
England, 32 HARV. L. REV. 447 (1919); Cramton, supra note 31; Borchard,
Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1 (1924), or for judicial reform of the
doctrine, see Davis, Sovereign Immunity in Suits Against Officers for Relief Other than
Damages, 40 CORNELL L.Q. 3 (1954); Block, Suits Against Government Officers and
the Sovereign Immunity Doctrine, 59 HARV. L. REV. 1060 (1946).
36
See Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77
HARV. L. REV. I, 2-19 (1963); cf THE FEDERALIST No. 81 (A. Hamilton).
Professor Jaffe suggests that we have bastardized the English doctrine by emphasizing
its strict theory rather than its lenient practice. He argues that the English practice
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the doctrine has been an important political issue since soon after the
Republic was founded. The Supreme Court, sitting in only its second
term, refused to insulate a state from judgment in Chisholm v.
Georgia. 31 That decision, however, was overridden by adoption in
1798 of the eleventh amendment, which proclaimed sovereign
immunity in suits against a state. 38 Apparently chastised, the Court
later extended the immunity by judicial fiat to the federal
government as well. 39 Later courts ingenuously repeated the bald
proposition that "no government has ever held itself liable to
individuals for the misfeasance .... of its officers," 40 ignoring that
the opposite doctrine was applied in almost every western European
country. 41 Appropriately, the first Supreme Court opinion holding
that the federal government enjoyed sovereign immunity cited no
authority and gave no reason for the doctrine's adoption. 42
Although the Court embraced federal sovereign immunity with
no analysis, it has sought with much deliberation to limit the
doctrine's application. In the first case to analyze the issue
comprehensively, United States v. Lee, 43 a descendant of General
Robert E. Lee sued to recover his estate, which had been seized by
makes one wonder "whether as a practical matter [sovereign immunity) ever has
existed. From time immemorial many claims affecting the Crown could be pursued in
the regular courts if they did not take the form of a suit against the Crown. And when
it was necessary to sue the Crown eo nomine consent apparently was given as of
course," Jaffe, supra, at I. He notes that English theory rather than practice was
adopted in America at least in part because the states feared being sued on their debts.
!d. at 19 & n.57.
n 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
11 The amendment provides: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one
of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any
Foreign State," U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
The wording of the amendment, curiously, has been read both narrowly and
broadly by the Court. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. I (1890) (reading the
amendment also to bar suits by the citizens of the same state); Duhne v. New Jersey,
251 U.S. 311 (1920); Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436 (1883) (immunity may be
impliedly waived).
J• Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264,411-12 (1821) (dictum).
0
' Gibbons v. United States, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 269,274 (1868).
"See Borchard, supm note 35, at 1, 2, 8 n. 24.
' 1 United States v. McLemore, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 286, 287-88 (1846). Wide
attention had been given to the concept of state sovereign immunity, however. See
THE FEDERALIST No. 81 (A. Hamilton).
" 106 U.S. 196 (1882). Judgment had been rendered in the circuit court, where the
United States was not a party, against individual federal officials. The United States
filed an appeal eo nomine.ld. at 196-97.
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federal soldiers and converted into Arlington cemetery. It was
admitted that, if authorized, the seizure would have been unconstitutional because no compensation was paid.44 In a five-to-four
decision the Court held that sovereign immunity was no bar to
determining the case because the officers had acted outside their
constitutional authority. 45
This analysis, after several false starts,46 was later applied to
enforce the Reconstruction amendments against states that claimed
themselves protected from suit by the eleventh amendment. Giving
full force to ideas that lurked beneath the surface of the Lee opinion,
the Court reasoned in Ex parte Y ounlf1 that a state law that is
unconstitutional is no law at all, and "the officer in proceeding under
such enactment comes into conflict with the superior authority of
[the] Constitution, and he is in that case stripped of his official or
representative character and is subjected in his person to the
consequences of his individual conduct. " 48
Sovereign immunity doctrine has fluctuated somewhat since the
Lee and Young decisions, 49 but the exception there recognized has
remained the principal standard for removing the immunity bar. The
two parallel lines of decision on state and federal sovereign immunity
deviated for a time during the early twentieth century when the Court
expressed a willingness to hear cases where the federal officials'
.. /d. at 219-20. The federal Court of Claims had not yet been created when Lee
was decided. Although the doctrine developed in Lee has remained important, the
Court has applied the rules differently to land cases now that a remedy in the Court of
Claims is available. See Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U.S. 643, 646-48 (1962).
•• 106 U.S. at 218-19 & passim. A variety of other grounds were suggested, most
of them resting on historical analysis.
•• See generally C. Wright, FEDERAL COURTS 183-86 (2d ed. 1970).
47
209 u.s. 123 (1908).
•• !d. at 159-60. The Court might have chosen to harmonize the direct conflict
between the eleventh and fourteenth amendments, but it avoided that issue. c_[. Case
Note, 50 HARV. L. REV. 56 (1937). It is the purpose of this Section to give a brief
overview of the development of sovereign immunity principles rather than to describe
the underlying factors that motivated constitutional decisionmaking. Nevertheless, it
should be noted here that the conflict in Young between the eleventh and fourteenth
amendments is a contest between the Court's institutional power to decide
constitutional questions, see Marbury v. Madison, 5. U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), and
those state forces that wish to insulate their activities from such review, see Cooper v.
Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958). In this light, the Young holding becomes a reaffirmation of
the Court's power to decide the underlying constitutional issue, and the label
sovereign immunity is applied whenever the Court decides that the state defendants
have not acted unconstitutionally.
•• See Davis, supra note 35, at 3-8.
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challenged action was not unconstitutional or ultra vires but simply
illegal under general law,S 0 but these federal cases were later
overruled or distinguished, and the doctrines applied to the states
and the federal government came closely together again in Larson v.
Domestic and Foreign Commerce Corp. 51
In Larson the plaintiff corporation had entered into a contract
with the War Assets Administration, a federal agency, for the
delivery of coal. When the corporation failed to deposit funds in
advance payment, as the agency deemed to be required by the
contract,S 2 the government cancelled the contract. The corporation
then commenced its suit asking that the contract be declared binding
and that Larson, as the agency's administrator, be enjoined from
selling or delivering the coal to any other buyer. Larson invoked the
doctrine of sovereign immunity in an attempt to bar the suit. 53
The Court54 proceeded to discuss the sovereign immunity issue
in a two-step analysis. First, the Court followed long-accepted
holdings 55 in ruling that the suit, though nominally against an
individual, is actually one against the United States if the request for
relief would run against the government's property or funds or would
affect the officer in the exercise of his official functions. 56 This part of
'"See, e.g., Goltra v. Weeks, 271 U.S. 536 (1926),.criticized in Larson v. Domestic
and Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 699-702 (1949). Insofar as Goltra may
have embodied some respect for state or general law as controlling the federal
government, cf. HART & WECHSLER, supra note 4, at 935 ('II 5), those ideas have
been eroded by more recent developments that recognize the need for the federal
bureaucracy to act without undue hindrance in attending to problems of a national
nature. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. ll I (1942); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 301 U.S. I (1937); cf. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448
(1957); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 229-30 (1947) (preemption
notions).
5
1 337 u.s. 682 (1949).
1
' The corporation had posted a letter of credit instead of the equivalent amount
in cash. !d. at 685.
, !d. at 684-86.
" Some commentators have remarked that the Larson opinion, so often relied
upon, was only a minority position. See, e.g., Cramton, supra note 31, at 405 n.73.
Chief Justice Vinson's opinion, however, is clearly labeled that "of the Court," and
Justice Douglas' short concurring statement plainly declares that "I have joined the
Court's opinion." 337 U.S. at 705. Justice Rutledge concurred only in the result, while
Justices Jackson, Frankfurter, and Burton dissented.
"The Court cited In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443 (1887), and Minnesota v. Hitchock,
185 U.S. 373 (1902). 337 U.S. at 687 n.6.
"337 U.S. at 687-88. This is the so-called "general rule." Cramton, supra note 31,
at416.
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the inquiry is little more than a perfunctory question. Because the
government can act only through its officers and agents,S7 virtually
every action against an officer will be in effect a suit against the
sovereign. Only when the plaintiff requests damages from an
individual defendant58 or when the suit is against the person for
activities totally extraneous from his official duties 59 is the
government not implicated.
The second prong of the Court's analysis carved two major
exceptions to the first test. Even if the initial inquiry indicates that
the immunity doctrine should apply, said the Court, the suit still does
not involve the sovereign if the officer's official actions were not
those sanctioned by the government, that is, if his actions exceeded
his authority or if they violated the Constitution. In such situations
the "officer is not doing the business which the sovereign has
empowered him to do or he is doing it in a way which the sovereign
has forbidden." 60 Although the Court chose words which carry the
quaint ring of agency law, the phrasing suggests real considerations.
The government cares only that legally and constitutionally
mandated activities are carried out. When a court enjoins official
actions that are ultra vires or unconstitutional, there is no
interference with legitimate governmental operations.61
Applying this analysis to the case before it, the Larson Court
found that the suit should properly be characterized as one against
the United States since a decree would affect the War Assets
Administration's coal delivery program. 62 The Court further held
that the exceptions to the rule did not apply because the corporate
buyers had not alleged that Larson's actions in revoking the contract
57
Cramton, supra note 31, at4l0-ll; but see Rockbridge v. Lincoln,449 F.2d 567,
573 (9th Cir. 1971).
"See, e.g. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). Only Jaw
enforcement officers and other low-level officials appear to bear the burden of their
individual misconduct. Higher officials are usually protected by a judicially created
"official immunity." See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974) (governor); Barr v.
Mateo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959); Sittenfield v. Tobringer, 459 F.2d 1137 (D.C. Cir. 1972)
(zoning officials).
"The Larson Court suggested as an example an officer's sale of his personal
home. 337 U.S. at 689.
60
337 U.S. at 689.
61
!d. at 689-90. Protection from undue interference ..yith government funds and
operations is the only basis for the immunity doctrine that is still seriously urged. See
id. at 704; Block, supra note 35, at 1061; cf pp. 360-63 infra.
62
337 U.S. at 703.
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were unconstitutional or ultra vires. 63 The plaintiffs arg.ued that
pfficial action that was illegal under general law also warranted an
exception to the sovereign immunity doctrine, but this contention
was pointedly rejected. 64 Attempting to wipe out all prior ambiguities
in the law, the Court tortuously reinterpreted most of its prior
decisions to fit them into the categories of ultra vires or
unconstitutional action. 65 Cases not admitting such a reading were
disapproved. 66 The finely drawn line between mere illegality and ultra
vires actions left a foreboding flaw to which we shall soon return. 67
The Larson ruling quickly took hold. Only five years after the
decision, Professor Davis was able to state that the Larson exceptions
were the "outstanding generalization" dominating the case law of
sovereign immunity. 68 Since 1949 the Court has only twice given full
consideration to the federal sovereign immunity issue, and each time
it unanimously reaffirmed the approach adopted by a bare fivemember majority in Larson. 69 Justice Clark's opinion for the Court in
Dugan v. Rank10 sets out the rules most succinctly. After noting that
the sovereign immunity doctrine applies when the suit against an
officer is in reality against the government, he reiterates that there are
exceptions:
Those exceptions are (I) action by officers beyond their
statutory powers and (2) even though within the scope of
61
!d. at 691, 703. Sovereign immunity may be waived by statute, Canadian
Aviator v. United States, 324 U.S. 215 (1945), and the Court suggested that the
corporation's remedy against the government could be pursued under such a statutory
waiver in the Court of Claims. 337 U.S. at 703 n.27.
•• 337 U.S. at 692, 699-702. The plaintifrs argument was that official action
constituting a common law tort was "illegal" as a matter of general law, would not be
authorized by statute, and thus could not be shielded by sovereign immunity. See
p. 332 and note 56 supra.
65 337 U.S. at 693-700. On whether the rereadings were labored, see Justice
Frankfurter's dissenting opinion, 337 U.S. at 716-32.
66
/d. at 699-702. Goltra v. Weeks, 271 U.S. 536 (1926) was the only case
specifically disapproved, but there were undoubtedly others. See 331 U.S. at 716-32
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
"See pp. 340-41 infra.
" Davis, supra note 35, at 8.
•• See Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609 (1963) and its companion case, City of Fresno
v. California, 372 U.S. 627 (1963); Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U.S. 643 (1962). In 1963,
the Court filed a two-paragraph per curiam order which dismissed an action in its
original jurisdiction without discussing the Larson-Dugan exceptions. Hawaii v.
Gordon, 373 U.S. 57 (1963). Cf. Georgia R.R. and Banking Co. v. Redwine, 342 U.S.
299 (1952) (eleventh amendment).
70
372 u.s. 609 (1963).

1975]

Sovereign Immunity

335

their authority, the powers themselves or the manner in
which they are exercised are constitutionally void .... In
either of such cases the officer's action "can be made the
basis of a suit for specific relief against the officer as an
individual ...." 71

2. Recent Cases in the Courts of Appeals
The very settled nature of the Larson-Dugan exceptions to
sovereign immunity is illustrated by the great number of recent Court
of Appeals decisions outside the employment area where the courts
have found little difficulty in applying the Supreme Court's
standards. A survey of the 28 instances since 196972 in which federal
sovereign immunity was considered shows 18 suits in which the
Larson-Dugan formulations were noted 73 and the defense of
immunity overruled.74 The suits ranged from attempts to stop a
"/d. at 621-33. The Court has not always pressed the technical requirement that
the official be sued in his personal capacity. See, e.g., Larson v. Domestic and Foreign
Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 688 n.8 (1949); Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325, 349
(1939).
"The period surveyed covers those cases decided since 1969, the year in which
sovereign immunity was first applied to bar federal employment discrimination cases.
See note 20 supra. Those cases in which courts found a statutory waiver of immunity,
e.g.• Romeo v. United States, 462 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 928
(1973), or proceeded to the merits and dismissed on the merits rather than on
sovereign immunity grounds, e.g., Reece v. United States, 455 F.2d 240 (9th Cir. 1972)
have been excluded.
"We are not here concerned with whether the Larson-Dugan principles were
correctly applied in the circumstances of each case, but only with whether the courts
understood what principles they were to use in deciding sovereign immunity cases.
" Eight cases find that the doctrine did not apply because the officer's acts were
unconstitutional. States Marine Lines, Inc. v. Schultz, 498 F.2d 1146, 1150-51 (4th Cir.
1974); Leonhard v. Mitchell, 473 F.2d 709, 712 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 412 U.S.
949 (1974); Richardson v. United States, 465 F.2d 844 (3rd. Cir. 1972) (en bane), cert.
denied, 410 U.S. 955 (1973) (in suit to require disclosure of CIA funding, no sovereign
immunity because alleged failure to disclose violates article I,§ 9 of the Constitution);
Gautreaux v. Romney, 448 F.2d 731,735 (7th Cir. 1971); Williams v. Eaton, 443 F.2d
422, 428-29 (lOth Cir. 1971); Menard v. Mitchell, 430 F.2d 486, 493 n.36 (D.C. Cir.
1970) (per Bazelon, C.J.) (no sovereign immunity where defendant had acted
unconstitutionally and without authority in keeping fingerprints of innocent
individuals in FBI files); Berk v. Laird, 429 F.2d 302, 306 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 869 (1971); National Ass'n of Gov't Employees v. White, 418 F.2d 1126,
1129-30 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (panel including Judge, now Chief Justice, Burger).
Ten cases hold that the officers exceeded their authority. See Schlafly v. Volpe,
495 F.2d 273, 277-78 (7th Cir. 1974); Association of N.W. Stee1headers v. United
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racially discriminatory federal housing program75 to a test of the
constitutionality of the Vietnam War. 76 In the other ten cases decided
since 1969, the Larson-Dugan exceptions were noted but held
inapplicable. In each of these decisions the Court ruled that the
federal official had acted within the scope of his authority and that
the action was not unconstitutional. 77
During this period, however, courts faced with federal employment discrimination claims failed to apply the Larson-Dugan
exceptions in considering the sovereign immunity defense. 78 Each of
these cases involved racial or ethnic discrimination which is
unquestionably unconstitutiona1,' 9 and yet in each case the court
ruled in favor of at least partial sovereign immunity. We turn to
those cases to find out what went wrong.
States Army Corps of Engineers, 485 F.2d 67, 69 (9th Cir. 1973); State Highway
Comm'n v. Volpe, 479 F.2d 1099, 1123 (8th Cir. 1973); National Helium Corp. v.
Morton, 455 F.2d 650, 654-55 {lOth Cir. 1971); Rockbridge v. Lincoln, 449 F.2d 567,
573-74 (9th Cir. 1971); Knox Hill Tenant Council v. Washington,448 F.2d 1045, 105253 (D.C. Cir. 1971); American Bible Society v. Blount, 446 F.2d 588, 596-98 (3rd Cir.
1971); Armstrong v. Udall, 435 F.2d 38,40 (9th Cir. 1970); Andros v. Rupp, 433 F.2d
70,72-73 (9th Cir. 1970); Washington v. Udall, 417 F.2d 1310, 1313-16 (9th Cir. 1969).
u Gautreaux v. Romney, 448 F.2d 731,735 (7th Cir. 1971).
76
Berk v. Laird, 429 F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 869 (1971). The
court ruled that although the claim may be nonjusticiable, sovereign immunity did not
apply because the plaintiff alleged that the war was unconstitutional. /d. at 306.
77
See Essex v. Vinal, 499 F.2d 226, 229 (8th Cir. 1974) (acceptance of taxes held
"illegal" but not ultra vires; therefore, remedy in court of claims); Junior Chamber of
Commerce v. U.S. Jaycees, 495 F.2d 883, 889 (lOth Cir. 1974) (tax officials acting
within authority and not unconstitutionally in granting tax exemption); National
Helium Corp. v. Morton, 486 F.2d 995, 1000 (lOth Cir. 1973); National Indian Youth
Council v. Bruce, 485 F.2d 97, 99 (lOth Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 946 (1974)
(Bureau of Indian Affairs said to be acting within discretion in operating all-Indian
Schools); Sierra Club v. Hickel, 467 F.2d 1048, 1051-54 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
411 U.S. 920 (1974); McQueary v. Laird, 449 F.2d 608,610 (lOth Cir. 1971)(storageof
chemical warfare materials at Rocky Mountain Arsenal authorized by law); Scholder
v. United States, 428 F.2d 1123, 1130 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 942 (1970);
Colson v. Hickel, 428 F.2d 1046, 1051 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 911
(1971); Blake Constr. Co. v. American Vocational Ass'n Inc., 419 F.2d 308, 312-13
(D.C. Cir. 1969); cf. Knight v. New York,443 F.2d 415,419-21 (2d Cir. l97l)(LarsonDugan rules in eleventh amendment context).
71
See p. 327 supra. Additionally, one maverick Fourth Circuit decision ruled
out the defense simply because it felt that judgment against the United States would
have insignificant impact on the government. See Littell v. Morton, 445 F.2d 1207,
1214 (4th Cir. 1971).
"See cases cited in notes 15 & 19 supra.
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B. Federal Employment Discrimination Cases

Those federal employment cases recognizing an expanded
sovereign immunity defense may be traced back to a common origin,
Judge (now Justice) Blackmon's opinion for the Eighth Circuit in
Gnotta v. United States. 80 In that case a federal civil servant sued his
supervisor and others, alleging that they had denied him advanced
training and job promotion solely because of his Italian ancestry.
Although such discrimination in this context was certainly unconstitutional81 and demanded application of the Larson-Dugan
exceptions, the court nevertheless ruled that· sovereign immunity
barred Gnotta's suit.
Although the Gnotta opinion has been in circulation for only
five years, it has attracted two very important adherents. In Ogletree
v. McNamara 82 the Sixth Circuit briefly adverted to Gnotta and then
found that sovereign immunity barred black civilian employees'
claims that the Air Force's hiring, promotion, and complaint
procedures were unconstitutionally discriminatory. 83 The Fifth
Circuit, in Blaze v. Moon, 84 dismissed on sovereign immunity grounds
a federal employee's suit alleging unconstitutional racial discrimination in hiring by the Corps of Engineers. ss The Fifth Circuit
•• 415 F.2d 1271 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 934 (1970).
"See note 19 supra. Such discrimination could be justified only upon a showing
of a compelling governmental interest in maintaining the discrimination. See
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Hyrabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S.
81 (1943). There is no intimation in the Gnotta opinion that the plaintifrs position
involved national security or that the government had any particular interest which
has been suggested as compelling in other contexts. See Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214, 218 (1944); Hyrabayashi v. United States, supra; cf Lee v. Washington,
390 U.S. 333 (1968) (per curiam).
"449 F.2d 93, 99 (6th Cir. 1971).
" The Sixth Circuit later faced two additional cases in which it invoked sovereign
immunity to bar federal employment suits. See Place v. Weinberger, 497 F.2d 412 (6th
Cir.}, cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 526 (1974); Bramblett v. Desobry, 490 F.2d 405 (6th Cir.},
cert denied, 95 S. Ct. 133 (1974): It is unclear from the Bramblett opinion whether the
employee's discharge was merely arbitrary or unconstitutional; the Larson-Dugan
exceptions would apply only in the latter sitution. In any event, the court's cursory
dismissal of the case without any inquiry into the scope of the officer's authority or the
constitutionality of his action shows a continuing misunderstanding of sovereign
immunity principles.
"440 F.2a 1348 (5th Cir. 1971).
" Blaze charged that the agency hired blacks in part-time and unclassified
positions while hiring whites for high paying jobs. While one set of Justice Department attorneys in the South was arguing that such practices could not be challenged
due to the sovereign immunity doctrine, another set of government attorneys was
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also followed Gnotta in Beale v. Blount, 86 but here the court began to
limit its obedience. Although a fired postal employee's request for an
injunction encountered the immunity obstacle, the panel decided
that relief in the nature of mandamus was a proper exception to
the doctrine. 87
The Ogletree and Blaze opinions merely adopted the Gnotta
holding without examination and therefore add little to its analysis.
Beale v. Blount, however, began to retreat from absolute immunity,
and its attempt to limit the Gnotta rationale has attracted support
from the Ninth Circuit. 88 A comparison of Beale and Gnotta will
illustrate how the courts' analytical problems began and how they
are beginning to solve those problems.
I. Gnotta v. United States89
Judge Blackmun's opinion in Gnotta is no model of clarity.
Discussing the merits of the case at the outset but turning to the
sovereign immunity issue when the merits begin to show difficulty,
his writing leaves somewhat unclear whether he considers Gnotta's
charge of discrimination to be unfounded or simply irrelevant to the
immunity issue. 90 A charitable reading of the opinion might
characterize the case as one where ethnic discrimination was claimed
but not proved/ 1
prosecuting the state of Alabama for having followed similar practices in its hiring and
promotion. See United States v. Frazer, 317 F. Supp. 1079 (M.D. Ala. 1970).
"461 F.2d 1133 (5th Cir. 1972).
17 Beale required, however, that the plaintiff exhaust administrative remedies as a
prerequisite to the mandamus action. 461 F.2d at 1138-40. The Beale trend away from
a strict Gnotta-type view of sovereign immunity was followed and expanded in Penn v.
Schlesinger, 490 F.2d 700, rev'd on other grounds, 497 F.2d 970 (5th Cir. 1974) (en
bane), which was in turn cited and followed in Petterway v. Veteran's Adm'n Hosp.,
495 F.2d 1223 (5th Cir. 1974). See p. 344 infra. Penn's reversal en bane has cast a
cloud on its more enlightened holding, and therefore upon Petterway as well.
Although the Penn reversal was technically for failure to exhaust remedies, the issues
which apparently concerned the Court closely parallel sovereign immunity
considerations-namely the respect for executive discretion in hiring and promotion
of employees. Cf. Ogletree v. McNamara, 449 F.2d 93 (6th Cir. 1971).
"See Bowers v. Campbell, 505 F.2d 1155 (9th Cir. 1974).
"415 F.2d 1271 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 934 (1970).
90 415 F.2d at 1274-75.
91 The record showed that Mr. Gnotta had carried his claim through
administrative appeals and that each level had ruled against his claim, including the
Civil Service Commission. 415 F.2d at 1275. "One is inclined," wrote Judge
Blackmun, "initially and on the face of plaintiff Gnotta's testimony at the
administrative hearing, to have a measure of sym~athy for him for he is, in a sense,
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Yet such a reading of Gnotta cannot be seriously maintained.
Judge Blackmun pointedly observes that "we could" and "we might"
decide the case by ruling on the factual issue of whether
discrimination was proved, but he decides that the sovereign
immunity question comes first. 92 Thus we must turn to a second
reading of Gnotta-that it found sovereign immunity to apply even
where it is alleged that officers had acted unconstitutionally and in
excess of their authority.
This reading of Gnotta still leaves the case extremely puzzling,
however, for Judge Blackmun did not wholly ignore the LarsonDugan exceptions to sovereign immunity. In a one-sentence
acknowledgment of Supreme Court authority, the opinion succinctly states:
This obviously is not a case which concerns either of the
exceptions recognized in Dugan v. Rank, ... namely, where
the officer's act is beyond his statutory power or where,
although the action is within the scope of his authority, the
power, or the manner of its exercise, is constitutionally void.
See Simons v. Vinson. 93
There is no discussion why the case so "obviously" fell outside the
Larson-Dugan exceptions. Nor does the reference to Simons v.
Vinson 94 immediately enlighten us. That was a suit to quiet title where
the claim of an ultra vires taking was based upon the unwarranted
assumption that the United States did not own the land. The case
was apparently cited only as a general reference to the rule that where
official action is not ultra vires or unconstitutional, immunity will
attach.
How then can ws; explain why Judge Blackmun thought the
Larson-Dugan exceptions inapplicable? A careful reading of the
opinion shows that the possible unconstitutionality of the defendants' actions is not in the minds of the judges. Although the relevant
Executive Order95 is discussed at great length, there is no hint of a
constitutional cause of action. Indeed, Gnotta's petition for
"bucking the establishment" or what seems to him to be an inflexible employment
hierarchy .... Contrastingly, one must note that the plaintiff chose to be sensitive
about, rather than to assert rightful pride in, his Italian ancestry." Id.
92
415 F.2d at 1276.
•• 415 F.2d at 1277 (citations omitted).
•• 394 F.2d 732 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 968 (1968) .
•, Exec. Order No. 11246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12319 (1965). It was substantially identical
to current Exec. Order No. 11478, 34 Fed. Reg. 12985 (1969).
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certiorari in the Supreme Court reveals that he did not seek review
based on a substantive violation of the fifth amendment's due
process clause. 96
Since Gnotta had not based his cause of action on the
Constitution, the only applicable Larson-Dugan exception would be
the ultra vires action formula. This interpretation of the court's
understanding of the case also explains why Judge Blackmun cited an
unrelated land title case such as Simons v. Vinson97 to support his
ruling that the exceptions were not present-in that case the ultra
vires approach rather than the unconstitutional action argument had
been pressed and rejected. 98
With this understanding of the case, one can begin to see the
outlines of an argument that would have supported Judge Blackmun's bald assertion that no sovereign immunity exception applied
to Gnotta's claim. It would build upon one of the inherent
weaknesses in Larson-the problem of drawing the dividing line
between activity which is merely "illegal" and that which is in excess
of authority or done without authority. 99 The Gnotta court may have
felt that since the supervisor had general authority to promote
personnel, any discrimination he practiced was merely illegal, a
mistake of law, and not outside his authority. 100 Even though the
court may have erred in this determination, such an analysis is at
least founded on the Larson-Dugan framework. 101
"Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 7, Gnotta v. United States, 397 U.S. 934
(1970), denying cert. to 415 F.2d 1271 (8th Cir. 1969). H!! instead wove an intricate
argument relying upon the executive order to create a substantive right from which the
court would imply a cause of action. !d. at 7, citing Jones v. Alfred Mayer Co., 392
U.S. 409 (1968). See415 F.2d at 1278-79.
1
9 See quotation at p. 339 supra.
"See note 96 supra.
99 See p. 332 & note 50; p. 334 supra.
'""The court emphasized that promotion decisions involve the exercise of
administrative discretion not normally subject to judicial review. 415 F.2d at 1276-77.
101 The counterargument would stress that the supervisor is denied authority by
the specific executive order to allow discriminatory intent to influence his decisions.
Denied such authority to discriminate, he acts ultra vires in q~aking national ancestry
the basis of his decision. See Penn v. Schlesinger, 490 F.2d 700, 703, rev'd on other
grounds, 497 F.2d 970 (5th Cir. 1974) (en bane). The tension between the two lines of
argument is illustrated in another context by the majority and the dissent in Sierra Club
v. Hickel, 467 F.2d 1048 (6th Cir. 1972), cert denied, 411 U.S. 920 (1973).
As to whether the ultra vires argument was properly applied in Gnotta itself, it is
interesting to note that Solicitor General Griswold expressly refused to rely on the
sovereign immunity argument when the Supreme Court considered the case.
Memorandum for the Respondents in Opposition, Gnotta v. United States, 397 U.S.
934 (1970), denying cert. to 415 F.2d 1271 (8th Cir. 1969). See also note 100 supra.
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2. Beale v. Blount102

Whether one takes the uncharitable view that Gnotta was simply
wrong in ruling out the Larson-Dugan exceptions or the more
realistic view that the court did not have before it the unconstitutional action argument, it is clear that the Gnotta decision should
have had no force in the Fifth and Sixth Circuit cases that followed
it. 103 In each of those cases the black employees involved specifically
stated their claims in terms of illegalities of constitutional
proportion. 104 Although the Fifth Circuit started out with an easy per
curiam adoption of the Gnotta precedent, 105 a subsequent panel soon
realized that something was seriously amiss in the Gnotta-inspired
superstructure. Still erroneously reading the case to control suits
alleging constitutional wrongs, the second panel began in Beale v.
Blount 106 to carve out exceptions of an order other than those
mentioned in Larson. Though the court's sense of uneasiness with
Gnotta was correct, its solution was wrong.
Beale alleged that his discharge by the United States Post Office
was racially motivated, claiming that local postal officials provoked
him to violence and then handed him sterner punishment than was
imposed on white employees. Although he had at first requested
damages, this prayer was dropped, and the only relief at issue was his
request for reinstatement and general injunctive relief. 107
The district court had dismissed the suit for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies, but the court of appeals chose to face the
sovereign immunity issue first. 108 Searching for a way to limit the
Gnotta holding, the court manufactured a distinction between
personal reinstatement and other injunctive relief. In three brief
'"' 461 F.2d 1133 (5th Cir. 1972).
'"'See notes 20-22 supra. Claims under42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970), see note 29 supra,
are also constitutionally based, deriving from Congress' power to define badges of
slavery violative of the thirteenth amendment. Cf Jones v. Alfred Mayer Co., 392 U.S.
409,437-44 (1968). Official action in violation of§ 1981 may also be considered ultra
vires the officer's authority. See Penn v. Schlesinger, 490 F.2d 700, rev'd on other
grounds, 491 F.2d 970 (5th Cir. 1974) (en bane).
'"'Penn v. Schlesinger, 490 F.2d 700, 702, rev'd on other grounds, 491 F.2d 970
(5th Cir. 1974); Blaze v. Moon, 440 F.2d 1348, 1349 (5th Cir. 1971); Ogletree v.
McNamara, 449 F.2d 93, 95 (6th Cir. 1971); see Beale v. Blount, 461 F.2d 1133, 1136
(5th Cir. 1972) (invoking civil rights statutes which enforce constitutional rights).
'"'Blaze v. Moon, 440 F.2d 1348 (5th Cir. 1971).
106
461 F.2d 1133 (5th Cir. 1972).
107
!d. at 1135-37 & n.2.
••• /d. at 113.
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paragraphs directing us to no authorities other than Gnotta and the
circuit's prior decision, which had cited only Gnotta, 109 the panel first
held that the "request for injunctive relief against the defendants'
allegedly racially discriminatory practices" was barred by the
doctrine of sovereign immunity. 110 However, the court then declared
that mandamus for reinstatement traditionally "has been regarded as
an exception to the doctrine that suits may not be maintained against
the United States without its consent." 111 The panel decided that
although the plaintiff had requested "injunctive relief' which it
found barred by the immunity doctrine, his request for reinstatement
would be treated as a petition for a "mandatory injunction" or
mandamus. 112 Said the court, "This by-passes the obstacle of the
doctrine of sovereign immunity .... " 113
The court was not entirely without citation to support its
argument that mandamus is an independent exception to the
sovereign immunity doctrine. But the sole case on which it relied,
Clackamas County v. McKay,l 14 is not authority for such a proposition. After a lengthy discussion of the uses of mandamus and the
sovereign immunity exceptions that had been only recently reviewed
in Larson v. Domestic and Foreign Commerce Corp., 115 the McKay
court explicitly held that a "non-discretionary act required of an
official falls within the exception stated in the Larson case ... relating
to acts without authority." 116
'"'Blaze v. Moon, 440 F.2d 1348 (5th Cir. 1971), was the case. Only Judge
Coleman sat on both the Blaze and Beale panels.
110
461 F.2d at 1137 (emphasis added).
111 /d. at 1137. The court ignored the fact that Gnotta, which it had just found
controlling on the injunctive relief issue, had also rejected mandamus as a basis for
relief. See415 F.2d at 1273.
111 461 F.2d at 1137, 1138. Of course, the writ of mandamus has been abolished in
federal district courts in favor of the unitary civil action. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8l(b).
Relief in the nature of mandamus is still available, however, upon the grounds for
which mandamus was previously granted./d.; cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1970). Mandamus
will issue to compel an officer to perform a ministerial duty imposed upon him by law.
See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803). While it is often said that
mandamus cannot control discretionary decisions, that somewhat overstates the
matter. If an officer has discretion within limits mandamus may be used to confine his
decisions to those limits setting aside those made outside his discretion. See, e.g.,
Work v. United States ex ref. Rives, 267 U.S. 175, 177-78 (1925). See generally Byse
& Fiocca, Section /36/ of the Mandamus and Venue Act of /962 and "Nonstatutory"
Judicial Review of Federal Administrative Action, 81 HARV. L. REV. 308 (1967).
m 461 F.2d at 1138.
'" 219 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1954), vacated as moot, 349 U.S. 909 (1955).
Ill 337
682 (1949).
"' 219 F.2d at 493 (emphasis added). Mandamus cases fall within the Larson-
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What the Beale court saw in McKay, therefore, was not a special
sovereign immunity rule for mandamus but rather a reflection of the
general rules expressed in Larson. Adoption of mandamus as an
exception to sovereign immunity surely accomplished the Beale
court's diplomatic need to respect a prior Fifth Circuit precedent
adopting Gnotta. But the diplomatic victory was costly: the narrow
relief of reinstatement was allowed, but injunctive relief, which is just
as permissible under Larson as reinstatement, was unjustly banned.
Thus Beale, although a step in the right direction, clings
unnecessarily to Gnotta and thus perpetuates an error that could
have serious con.sequences in a case where the mandamus remedy
would not lie but where injunctive relief would, except for the BealeGnotta bar, be available. 117 The shortest route out of this forest is
back to the established rules: where plaintiffs contend that federal
officers have acted unconstitutionally, the first of the Larson-Dugan
exceptions clearly applies, and the suit, regardless of its jurisdictional
basis, may not be construed as one against the United States. 118
3. Recent Case Developments

While the Sixth Circuit has only recently reaffirmed its
commitment to the sovereign immunity doctrine in employment
cases, 119 recent decisions in the Fifth and Ninth Circuits indicate that
Dugan exceptions because in each case the official is alleged to have acted contrary to
his authority in refusing to undertake the required activity. See Menard v. Mitchell,
430 F.2d 486,493 n.36 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Peoples v. United States Dep't of Agriculture,
427 F.2d 561, 564-65 (D.C. Cir. 1970). See also note 112 supra. In fact, sovereign
immunity can be a successful defense in a mandamus action. Where mandamus does
not lie because the challenged official action is discretionary, the court may dispose of
the case on sovereign immunity grounds. See McQueary v. Laird, 449 F.2d 608 (lOth
Cir. 1971); White v. Administrator of Gen. Servs. Adm'n, 343 F.2d 444 (9th Cir.
1965); Smith v. United States, 333 F.2d 70 (lOth Cir. 1964). See generally Byse,
Proposed Reforms in Federal "Nonstatutory" Judicial Review: Soveriegn Immunity,
Indispensable Parties Mandamus, 15 HARV. L. REV. 1479 (1962).
117
Cf. Gautreaux v. Romney, 448 F.2d 731 (7th Cir. 1971) (discrimination in site
selection and housing construction; decision to build discretionary). But see note 112
supra.
"'See p. 335 supra. The case is ordinarily now ready for trial. See Menard v.
Mitchell, 328 F. Supp. 718 (D.D.C. 1971}, on remand from 430 F.2d 486 (D.C. Cir.
1970); Land v. Dollar, 82 F. Supp. 919 (D.D.C. 1948), rev'd, 184 F.2d 245 (D.C. Cir.
1950}, on remand from 330 U.S. 731 (1947).
1
" See note 21 supra.
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the courts may well be moving back to the basic Larson-Dugan
position. The Fifth Circuit has continued its retreat from Gnotta in
Penn v. Schlesinger. 120 There, black federal employees, suing on
behalf of themselves and similarly situated blacks in Alabama,
alleged that 17 federal agencies in the state maintained racially
discriminatory promotion and advancement practices. Plaintiffs
based one cause of action on 42 U.S.C. § 1981. 121 The court first held
the mandamus exception of Beale 122 to be applicable. 123 It further held
that the Larson-Dugan exceptions were applicable and that a
violation of Section 1981 by a federal official was an ultra vires act,
court consideration of which was not barred by sovereign
immunity.J2 4 Thus in Penn, the court both retained its allegiance to
the circuit's Gnotta-type precedents and returned to the LarsonDugan exceptions. 125 As we noted earlier, 126 mandamus as an
exception to sovereign immunity is merely one example of the
Larson-Dugan rules as applied. The practical result of the Penn
decision, therefore, is to reinstate the Larson-Dugan exceptions, with
mandamus getting "double coverage." 127
One other recent decision should also be noted. The Ninth
Circuit, in Bowers v. Campbell, 128 faced the issue of sovereign
immunity in federal employment discrimination suits for the first
time. Significantly, the court ignored Gnotta and simply held the
Larson-Dugan exception applicable. 129 The court did cite Beale v.
Blount for the proposition that sovereign immunity may limit the
490 F.2d 700, rev'd on other grounds, 497 F.2d 970 (5th Cir. 1974) (en bane).
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970) reads: "All persons within the jurisdiction of the
United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and
enforce contracts •.• as is enjoyed by white citizens .... " In Sanders v. Dobbs Houses
Inc., 43 I F.2d 1097 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 948 (1971), the Fifth Circuit
held that Section 1981 provided a cause of action against private employment
discrimination. In the instant case, the court extended that holding to discriminatory
acts by federal officials. 490 F.2d at 702.
m See pp. 341-42 supra.
111
490 F.2d at 701.
11'/d. at 703-04.
111 /d. at 704-05. The en bane reversal, 497 F.2d 970 (5th Cir. 1974), was solely_on
the grounds of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
126 See pp. 342-43 supra.
m See Petterway v. Veterans Adm'n Hosp., 495 F.2d 1223 (5th Cir. 1974).
ua 505 F.2d 1155 (9th Cir. 1974).
119 /d. at 1158. The court found that racially discriminatory employment decisions
by federal officials were ultra vires their authority as limited by 42 U.S.C. § 1981
(1970).
110
111
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relief to which the plaintiff would ultimately be entitled, 130 but it
appeared to defer the relief issue until after trial. 131
In short, recent developments suggest that Gnotta's persuasiveness in other circuit courts is waning. The Larson-Dugan rules
are being reasserted to allow federal employees to obtain a trial on
their claims of racial discrimination. This return to basic concepts
will, in most suits, end all talk of sovereign immunity. Yet Penn and
Bowers, pursuing what was only implied in Beale, 132 realized that
specific relief orders may create a second set of sovereign immunity
problems. In this area there are no clear rules of the Larson-Dugan
type to guide courts. Indeed, as we shall see, the courts are searching
for standards to define what role sovereign immunity should play in
determining relief for plaintiffs who are successful in establishing
federal employment discrimination.
Since there is a search for standards in this area, the next part of
the Article will turn away from employment discrimination cases to a
more general consideration of the interests that underlie sovereign
immunity. Finding those interests to be the separate constitutional
powers of the branches of the federal government, we shall show how
a separation of powers analysis provides the best standards for
considering relief issues that arise under the label of sovereign
immunity.
II. SEPARATING THE JURISDICTIONAL AND RELIEF
ASPECTS OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

A. The Precedents
We saw above that recent employment discrimination cases
have begun to separate two distinct issues often merged in sovereign
immunity analysis 133-jurisdiction to entertain the suit and power to
grant certain kinds of relief. The Larson-Dugan exceptions respond
only to the first of these issues; if the complaint fails to claim that the
challenged action falls outside the officers' constitutional or
statutory authority, the court is without jurisdiction to hear the suit.
But even if the exceptions apply to give the court jurisdiction to hear
505 F.2d at 1158.
'" ld. Cf. Petterway v. Veterans Adm'n Hosp., 495 F.2d 1223, 1225 (5th Cir.
1971).
"'See pp. 341-42supra.
"' See pp. 343-44 supra.
130
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the claim, the court might nevertheless be barred by sovereign
immunity considerations from granting certain types of relief.
The Larson court itself suggested in a footnote that the form of
relief could intrude upon legitimate interests of the sovereign:
Of course, a suit may fail, as one against the sovereign, even
if it is claimed that the officer being sued has acted
unconstitutionally or beyond his statutory powers, if the
relief requested cannot be granted by merely ordering the
cessation of the conduct complained of but will require
affirmative action by the sovereign or the disposition of
unquestionably sovereign property. North Carolina v.
Temple, 134 U.S. 22 (1890).' 34
While it is true that cases predating Larson often merged the
jurisdictional and relief aspects of sovereign immunity, 135 modern
Supreme Court cases have recognized the separation. In a recent
decision involving state sovereign immunity, 136 Edelman v. Jordan, 137
the Court made this distinction explicit. The case challenged the
constitutionality of state administration of a joint federal-state
welfare program. The court of appeals ruled that the defendant
officials' actions were inconsistent with overriding federal law and
therefore unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause. 138 The court
reasoned that once the sovereign immunity hurdle has been cleared
by a finding of unconstitutional action, both prospective injunctive
relief and retroactive welfare payments were available as remedies. 139
The Supreme Court disagreed on the retroactive payments issue. In
an opinion by Justice Rehnquist, the Court held that while federal
courts have the power to require the states to run their programs
111

Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 691 n.11

(1949).
111 See, e.g.• North Carolina v. Temple, 134 U.S. 22 (1890); Noble v. Union R.L.
Ry., 147 U.S. 165 (1893). These cases can be explained by the slow evolution of
sovereign immunity rules, see pp. 329-35 supra, and traditional American civil
procedure's merging of the concepts of cause of action and relief. See R. Field & B.
Kaplan, CIVIL PROCEDURE 216-30, 261-75, 306-13 (temp. 2d ed. 1968) (collecting
English and American sources).
uo U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
llJ 415
651 (1974).
111 Jordan v. Weaver, 472 F.2d 985 (7th Cir. 1973).
"'/d. at 990-95. The court admitted that on certain occasions equitable relief
would be unavailable, but it associated these occasions with the nature and status of
the parties rather than with the relief power itself. See id. at 992 (nonresident suits
under state-created causes of action).
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constitutionally or not at all in the future, they have no power, 140
because of the sovereign immunity doctrine, to order retroactive
payments from the state treasury .141
The distinction between the jurisdictional and relief aspects of
sovereign immunity has important practical ramifications. On the
one hand, once the separation is acknowledged, judicial reluctance to
grant any specific relief requested can no longer serve to bar the
plaintifPs entire suit. 142 On the other hand, recognition of a second
stage of sovereign immunity analysis means that there may remain at
the relief stage a legitimate role for some governmental interests
rebuked at the Larson-Dugan level of analysis, such as the executive's
asserted interest in controlling its own employment practices. 143
Finally, in those cases where some legitimate governmental interests
are recognized at the relief stage, courts will have to face the difficult
task of formulating relief which will clearly protect the plaintiff's
constitutional rights without interfering in protected governmental
functions.
B. Current Approaches to the Relief Issue

Even after the separate nature of the relief issue is established,
there remains the difficult problem of determining the circumstances
in which sovereign immunity may be utilized to bar relief. Whereas
••• 415 U.S. 663-64. The Court adhered to the verbal formulation that eleventh
amendment sovereign immunity "partakes of the nature of a jurisdictional bar." /d. at
678. This does not indicate a lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suitthe case had been tried already and partial relief given. Rather the jurisdictional issue
here is Jack of jurisdiction-power-to order the relief described by the Court.
"' Two recent Second Circuit cases illustrate how the lower courts have managed
to separate jurisdictional and relief aspects of sovereign immunity. In both cases the
court allowed the suit alleging unconstitutional action to be brought but ruled that
certain kinds of relief violated- sovereign immunity principles. See Rothstein v.
Wyman, 467 F.2d 226 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 921 (1973); Sostre v.
McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971) (en bane) (injunctive relief permitted, damages
refused).
"' Of course, where the plaintiff limits himself to asking for relief which is known
to be barred, it is an empty gesture to permit a full trial. That will usually not be the
case, however. See cases cited in note 141 supra.
"' Although Gnotta and the cases which followed it were decided on sovereign
immunity grounds, it is apparent that the courts were more concerned with the power
of the executive branch to control its employment practio;es without court interference.
See Gnotta v. United States, 415 F.2d at 1276-77; Ogletree v. McNamara, 449 F.2d 93,
99-100 (6th Cir. 1971); Penn v. Schlesinger, 490 F.2d 700, 707 (dissenting opinion),
adopted 491 F.2d 970 (1974) (en bane).
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the Larson-Dugan exceptions are easily, almost mechanically applied,
there is no consensus over what test should be used to decide
sovereign immunity issues at the relief stage of a suit. Court decisions
suggest various approaches to dealing with this critical problem.
1. An Intolerable Burden Test

One approach has been to return to Larson's footnote eleven,
where the Court observed that a suit may fail, even after clearing the
initial sovereign immunity hurdles, if the relief requested would
require affirmative action by the sovereign or disposition of
government property . 144
Courts discussing footnote eleven have emphasized the word
"may" to show that in such a situation the suit need not necessarily
fail, but simply may fail. They point out that reading the footnote
broadly to outlaw every injunction interfering with government
programs would render meaningless the Larson text's dual exceptions to the immunity doctrine. 145 This view is supported by the text
of the Court's opinion in Larson, which suggests that not all
affirmative relief is forbidden. The Court cites approvingly several
cases in which the defendant was ordered to take action in his official
capacity} 46 Mandamus cases further attest to the fact that affirmative
relief does not automatically raise the bar of sovereign immunity. 147
As a guideline for what is included within the "may" of footnote
eleven, several courts have suggested an "intolerable burden" test.
The Seventh Circuit's decision in Schlafly v. Volpe_, 148 an impoundment case, is a recent example. In that case the Secretary
of Transportation had allegedly exceeded his authority in
impounding certain highway trust funds from distribution to the
states, and thus the Larson-Dugan exception for ultra vires acts
erased sovereign immunity as a defense to the hearing of the suit. 149
"' 337 U.S. at 691 n.l I. The footnote is set out in full at p. 346supra.
~<l See, e.g., Washington v. Udall, 417 F.2d 1310, 1317 (9th Cir. 1969); Turner v.
King's River Conservation Dist., 360 F.2d 184, 189-90 (9th Cir. 1966).
146 Most important in this regard is the Court's reference to habeas corpus, where
defendant jailors, who held prisoners only by virtue of an official duty, are ordered to
release the prisoner. 337 U.S. at 690.
1" Compare United States ex ref. Goldberg v. Daniels, 231 U.S. 218 (1913), with
Clackamus County, Ore. v. McKay, 219 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1954), vacated as moot,
349 u.s. 909 (1955).
141
495 F.2d 273 (7th Cir. 1974).
1
" !d. at 278-79.
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Nevertheless, since the plaintiff requested that the Secretary be
ordered to release the improperly impounded funds, the court was
faced with footnote eleven's warning that such affirmative relief
"may" violate sovereign immunity. 150 The "intolerable burden" test
adopted by the court gives content to the "may" with a forseeability
test-determining what action the government probably would have
taken absent the defendant official's ultra vires action. If the
requested relief asks approximately for what was statutorily required
but not executed, then the intrusion upon legitimate governmental
interests is apparently judged tolerable, lSI at least when compared to
the harm done to the plaintiffs if no relief is granted. 152
The intolerable burden test is quite attractive in that it
functionally seeks to identify the legitimate governmental interests
that might be harmed by granting relief. The foreseeability aspect of
the inquiry, however, is useful only in cases where ultra vires action
has been found, for in such cases the offending officials are
interjecting only their personal (albeit policy-based) interest in
subverting Congress' command. The government's interest is simply
assumed to be that established in the legislation, and therefore
judicially requiring the offical to act as Congress directed by
tautology imposes no "intolerable burden" on governmental
operations. 153
Where unconstitutional action is at issue, however, the burden
test becomes wholly subjective because the court has no standards to
guide its determination of tolerability. For example, does an order
requiring that a class of unconstitutionally discharged employees be
given back pay totaling several million dollars impose an intolerable
burden? Here the government has a fiscal interest entirely distinct
"" /d. at 279-80.
"' /d. at 280. In the impoundment situation, the Schlajly court notes that but for
the Secretary's action the funds sought would have been disbursed as required by
Congress. Thus, the requested affirmative relief-ordering the release of fundswould burden the government fisc '"only to the extent that Congress has already
authorized ... .'" /d.• quoting State Highway Comm'n. v. Volpe, 479 F.2d 1099, 1123,
rehearing denied, 479 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1973).
"'The Schlajly court suggests that the intolerable burden test is an equitable
balancing act, measuring whether the relief order's burden on governmental functions
outweighs private harm. 495 F.2d at 280. Yet since the court finds the burden in the
case before it negligible, it does not face the question of whether a private harm might
ever be so great as to justify a considerable burden on government activities, and thus
we cannot be sure that the equitable balancing is meant as a serious aspect of the
intolerable burden test. Cf Washington v. Udall, 417 F.2d 1310 (9th Cir. 1969).
"'See, e.g.• Schlafly v. Volpe, 495 F.2d 273,280 (7th Cir. 1974).
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from its legislated interest in having an officer carry out his duties,
and certainly any court order in this area would interfere with the
former interest to some degree. But what degree of interference
creates an "intolerable" burden? Nor do the foreseeability aspects of
the burden test lead us out of this subjective inquiry. It is, of course,
evident that the employees would have been paid but for the official's
unconstitutional action, but does that question show us whether the
burden of using the agency's operating funds for back pay is an
"intolerable" burden? 154
The Schlajly result certainly has a visceral appeal. Where
unconstitutional action is charged, however, its intolerable burden
test offers little firm guidance to courts faced with a sovereign
immunity argument concerning relief. Basically tautological in
conception, it leads ultimately to a wholly subjective inquiry.
2. An Affirmative Relief Test

A second line of cases trying to define the sovereign immunity
aspects of relief also focuses on Larson's footnote eleven. 155 These
cases ignore the footnote's "may" language, assume that all
affirmative relief is barred, and then try to determine what relief is in
fact affirmative and what is only prohibitory. Thus the test becomes
not the tolerability of the relief but whether the relief should be
characterized as affirmative or negative.
The Eighth Circuit, in State Highway Commission v. Volpe, 156
used this approach in considering the same impoundment issue that
the Seventh Circuit faced in Schlajly v. Volpe. 157 As in the functional
analysis used in the "intolerable burden" test, the court attempted to
discern what is in fact "affirmative" relief by focusing on what would
have happened but for the defendant official's action.IS8 Thus
applied, the affirmative relief test suffers the same drawbacks noted
in the intolerable burden test. 159
u• Cf. Edelman v. Jordan 415 U.S. 651 (1974) (order of back benefits to welfare
recipients necessarily diminishes amount available for others).
us For the text of the footnote seep. 346 supra.
uo 479 F.2d 1122, denying rehearing to 419 F.2d 1099 (8th Cir. 1973).
157 495 F.2d 273 (7th Cir. 1974), discussed at p. 348 supra.
ua479 F.2d at I 123 (citations omitted). Similar arguments have been advanced by
commentators with regard to other disbursement situations. See Block, supra note 35,
at 1063-64; Davis, supra note 35, at 15-16.
119
Seep. 349 supra.
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Nor does it seem possible to decide whether a relief order is
affirmative or negative by referring to its inherent nature. Whether
an order is classified as prohibitory or mandatory depends to a great
degree on how the court chooses to word its order; 160 to prohibit an
official from refusing to undertake an act is often no differenr from
compelling him to act. 161 Thus, this approach too appears to offer
little help in devising standards for sovereign immunity issues in the
relief context.
3. The Inductive Logic Approach

Some courts and commentators have come to the conclusion
that an analytical solution to the problem of sovereign immunity
implications of relief is hopeless. Finding the Supreme Court's
reasoning in sovereign immunity cases to be confusing and
contradictory, 162 they look only at the case results, try to determine
what kinds of relief seem to give the Court the most trouble, and
from the results inductively formulate a few simple rules.
This approach has met with mixed success. Most law review
articles begin by cataloguing the cases decided one way and
another,Z 63 try inductively to formulate some guidelines, and end up
declaring the whole line of cases a disaster area. 164 Many draw the
conclusion that cases dealing with damages against the government
or disposition of government-held property are likely to face
160
See, e.g., Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325 (1939). There, the Secretary of State had
denied Miss Elg a passport "solely on the ground" that she was not an American
citizen. /d. at 349. She established her legal right to American citizenship. In
considering what relief to grant, the Court faced the question of whether the Secretary
of State should be included in the Court's decree. The Court decided. that despite the
Secretary's powers of discretion regarding passports, mandamus should issue. "The
decree," reasoned the Court,"... would in no way interfere with the exercise of the
Secretary's discretion with respect to the issue of a passport but would simply preclude
the denial of a passport on the sole ground that Miss Elg had lost her American
citizenship." /d. at 350.
'"See Block, supra note 35, at 1073-74 (arguing that the distinction between
affirmative and negative relief is in most cases artificial).
'"See Schlafly v. Volpe, 495 F.2d 273, 278 (7th Cir. 1974); Knox Hill Tenant
Council v. Washington, 448 F.2d 1045, 1051 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Littell v. Morton, 445
F.2d 1207, 1212 (4th Cir. 1971); cf. Zapata v. Smith, 437 F.2d 1024, 1025 (5th Cir.
1971).
163
E.g., Davis, supra note 35, at 8-17; Cramton, supra note 31, at 400-05, 422-27;
Block, supra note 35, at 1063-75.
164
E.g., Cramton, supra note 31,418-20.
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dismissal on immunity grounds, 165 but they seem able to account for
the developments only in historical terms. 166 While some recommend
legislative reform to clear the air, 167 others suggest maxims to guide
the Court. 168
The inductive logic approach has a respectability brought on by
Supreme Court usage, the most recent example being Justice
Rehnquist's opinion for the Court in Edelman v. Jordan. 169 Rather
than trying to formulate a general rule, Justice Rehnquist was
satisfied simply to define the area of concern, payments from the
government treasury. 170 The remainder of the opinion is devoted to
showing that in futuro relief orders do not necessarily require
treasury payments or disrupt fiscal planning while retroactive
payments do have such an impact. 171
Yet the precedents are not as clear as Justice Rehnquist would
have us believe, and that is the problem with the inductive logic
approach. For every case forbidding relief that has an impact on the
public treasury, a contrary opinion approving such orders can be
found. Indeed, the Court, only one term after its Edelman opinion,
approved by unanimous vote a relief order requiring the treasury to
pay out funds appropriated for water pollution control projects. 172
161
See, e.g., id. at 402, 423; Davis, supra note 35, at 8-18; Block, supra note 35, at
1072-73.
1
" See, e.g., Block, supra note 35, at 1073.
1" E.g., Cramton, supra note 31, at 428-29 (recommending a proposal by the
Administrative Conference of the United States); Borchard, supra note 35, at 3.
161 E.g., Davis, supra note 35, at 17 (government responsibility is to be preferred
"over irresponsibility"); Laski, supra note 35, at 466 (the real need is the enforcement
of responsibility); Cramton, supra note 31, at 415 (ask whether the benefits of review
are outweighed by interference with government programs).
169
415 U.S. 651 (1974). For an earlier example see Larson v. Domestic & Foreign
Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 714-15 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
110
!d. at 663.
171 !d. at 664-70. The extent to which Edelman might affect state employment
discrimination cases is unclear. Monetary recoveries, whether for attorneys' fees or
back pay, seem to be in jeopardy, although it remains to be seen whether both would
be treated the same under Edelman. As to attorneys' fees, compare Jordan v. Fusari,
496 F.2d 646 (2d Cir. 1974), with Jordon v. Gilligan, 500 F.2d 701 (6th Cir. 1974),
Skehan v. Board of Trustees, 501 F.2d 31, 42 (3d Cir. 1974). An en bane opinion is
expected soon to resolve the split on this issue within the Fifth Circuit. Compare Gates
v. Collier, 489 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1973), with Named Individual Members v. Texas
State Highway Dep't, 496 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1974).
111 See Train v. City of New York, 95 S. Ct. 839 (1975). The Court accepted the
government's concession of the sovereign immunity issue, id. at 843 n.7, which was
more fully litigated in the lower courts. See City of New York v. Train, 494 F.2d 1033,
1038-39 & n.l2 (D.C. Cir. 1974), affg, 358 F.Supp. 669,673 (D.D.C. 1973).
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Among the older cases, conflicting decisions relating to land decrees
and money judgments are numerous. 173
These inductive logic approaches do not advance our inquiry
because they identify problem areas without telling us why they are
prob~em areas. They identify the types of relief that courts are
reluctant to grant, but they do not explain the cause of the
reluctance. Why are affirmative orders to release public funds
permitted in some cases but forbidden in others? Why were
judgments against sovereign land and the public treasury thought to
raise sovereign immunity problems? Might interference with
executive control over hiring and promotion be thought to raise
similar considerations in the 1970's?
The next Section of this Article will try to develop an analytical
framework that is consistent with the considerations expressed in the
original Larson-Dugan exceptions and that can identify which
considerations are important in cases where affirmative relief against
federal officials in their official capacities is requested. This mode of
analysis builds on our traditional constitutional law notions of
separation of powers. It is these considerations that hide behind the
mask of sovereign immunity.
III. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AS A SEPARATION OF
POWERS ISSUE

A. The Larson-Dugan Exceptions
Any discussion of sovereign immunity doctrine as a device for
allocating constitutional decisionmaking power must be based upon
an appreciation of the substantive constitutional roles of the several
branches of government. This Section provides that background. It
also goes further and shows how the Larson-Dugan exceptions, the
elemental jurisdictional rules of sovereign immunity, define the
interface between the basic substantive roles performed by the
judiciary, Congress, and the executive. In suggesting that separation
of powers interests accurately account for the Larson-Dugan
jurisdictional aspects of sovereign immunity, we lay the groundwork
for a later showing that these interests also underlie the sovereign
immunity aspects of relief.
"'See Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U.S. 643, 646 (1962) (land); compare Cunni!lgham
v. Macon & B. R.R., 109 U.S. 446 (1883), with Davis v. Gray, 83 U.S. (16 \Vall.)
203 (1872); compare Virginia Coupon Cases, 114 U.S. 269 (1884), with Hagood v.
Southern, 117 U.S. 52 (1886).
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I. The Judiciary's Power and Obligation

We begin with two straightforward propositions about judicial
power. First, the Court in its role as interpreter of the Constitution is
competent to decide constitutional issues whenever it has proper
jurisdiction. Second, that power is not merely permissive, it is
mandatory and carries a corollary duty to provide redress for
constitutional violations whenever possible. The first proposition
looks like black letter law, but it runs up against the sovereign
immunity doctrine under which courts have refused to exercise their
otherwise proper jurisdiction. The following discussion will suggest
that sovereign immunity as a self-limiting device is quite possibly
unconstitutional. That argument will be the predicate for later
establishing that sovereign immunity must have its roots in
limitations due to the prerogatives and powers of another branch of
government and not in judicial self-denial.
The competence of the federal courts to hear and determine
constitutional issues springs from article III and Marbury v.
Madison. 114 The Court's appellate jurisdiction under article III gives
it an independent institutional power. Although Congress may by
statute limit this jurisdiction, 115 the Court's interest is sufficiently
strong, it has been argued, that any wholesale attempt to limit
Supreme Court review of constitutional questions would itself be
unconstitutional. 176
174 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803). The power assumed in Marbury to rule on the
constitutionality of congressional statutes was later used to pass on the question of
whether actions taken by federal and state executive officials were consistent with
constitutional restrictions. See, e.g., Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325 (1939) (civil action);
United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898) (habeas corpus) (both cases
involving unconstitutional action by federal officials); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123
(1908); Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278 (1913) (state
officials). The Court recently reaffirmed its authority to determine whether the other
branches of government had overstepped their powers. United States v. Nixon, 418
u.s. 683,703-05 (1974).
m U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. The power of limitation extends only to the
appellate jurisdiction. A legislative restraint on district court jurisdiction may limit the
Court's appellate jurisdiction from those federal courts, Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8
How.) 441 (1850), but will not limit the Court's appellat.e jurisdiction over the subject
matter, which still may come up through the state courts.
17' See Hart, Tlte Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction ofFederal Courts: An
Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362 (1953); Ratner, Congressional Power
Over the Appellate Jurisdiction oftlte Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 157,201-02
(1960); cf. R. Berger, CONGRESS V. THE SUPREME COURT 285-96 (1969). But
see Wechsler, Tlte Courts and tlte Constitution, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1005-06
(1965).
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If Congress cannot undercut the Court's power to decide
constitutional questions, neither may the Court itself refuse to do its
job of constitutional adjudication. It may not decline to exercise the
jurisdiction conferred upon it by the Constitution 177 and Congress. 178
As Chief Justice Marshall said a century and a half ago in Cohens v.
Virginia, 179
It is most true that this Court will not take jurisdiction if it
should not; but it is equally true that it must take jurisdiction
if it should. The judiciary cannot, as the legislature may,
avoid a measure, because it approaches the confines of the
constitution . . . . We have no more right to decline the
exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that
which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to
the constitution. 180
Certainly the Court's appellate jurisdiction has become more
discretionary since the introduction of certiorari, but that manner of
controlling the docket may properly be characterized as a congressionally mandated exception to jurisdiction as authorized under
article lll. 181 Similarly, although the Court has developed techniques,
as Justice Brandeis called them, "for its own governance in the cases
confessedly within its jurisdiction," 182 these practices are not truly
refusals to hear a constitutional issue. Rather they are either
demands that the issue be framed in a manner capable of judicial
resolution or methods for exercising jurisdiction and deciding the
case, albeit not on constitutional grounds. 183 Indeed, on those
Congress has at times limited appellate jurisdiction as to certain causes of actions,
see Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869), but with little impact on the
Court's actual appellate review power, see Ex Parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85
(1869); 2 Warren, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 45595 (1935 ed.). In this century Congress has by statute approved a complete Supreme
Court appellate jurisdiction as to constitutional issues. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1252-58
(1970).
171
U.S. CONST. art. III.
178
28 u.s.c. §§ 1252-58 (1970).
119
19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
''"!d. at 404.
"' U.S. CONST. art. III,§ 2.
112
Ashwander v. T.V.A., 297 U.S. 288, 346 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
"' See id. at 346-48. Brandeis' rules one (adversariness), five (standing), and six
(standing), and perhaps two, fall in the first category and stem from the constitutional
limitation on the court to hear only "cases and controversies." Cf Association of
Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970). Brandeis rules three
(narrow ruling), four (nonconstitutional grounds), and seven (narrow statutory
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occasions when the Court, by stretching one of the Brandeisian rules,
has come close to evading its constitutional duty to hear
constitutional questions, it has drawn heavy fire} 84 Adjudicating the
constitutional issue when it is properly presented is still recognized as
the Court's constitutional responsibility.t 85
An unlimited sovereign immunity doctrine would contravene
this constitutional duty. Unlike delaying techniques which only
initially sort out issues between the state and federal courts, 186 an
unlimited immunity doctrine completely cuts off adjudication in all
federal courts. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Court has
developed the Larson-Dugan exceptions to sovereign immunity, for
at least the second exception regarding unconstitutional action is
constitutionally required. 187 The Court cannot decline to exercise its
article III jurisdiction to decide the claim of unconstitutional action.
The power and duty to hear constitutional questions also
extends to relief, for the Court is obligated to give effective relief to
vindicate the constitutional rights at issue. Where lower courts have
rendered a form of relief that does not eliminate the constitutional
wrong, the Supreme Court has consistently ordered 188 that more
coercive measures be applied. For example, in Turner v. Fouche, 189 the
plaintiffs had proved a statistical prima facie case of racial
discrimination in juror selection, and the district court ordered the
jury box refilled. When the new composition yielded statistics that
construction), and perhaps two, fall into the second category mentioned in the text.
When in the second category of cases the Court cannot settle t~e parties' dispute by
deciding the nonconstitutional issues, it must then consider the constitutional issue.
See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
'"See Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues"-A Comment on
Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. I, 16 (1964) ("The
Brandeis rules are a far cry from the neo-Brandeisian fallacy that there is a general
'Power to Decline the Exercise of Jurisdiction Which Is Given,' that there is a general
discretion not to adjudicate though statute, Constitution, and remedial law present a
'case' for decision and confer no discretion.")
111
See, e.g., Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 102 (1968).
116
E.g., abstention, see England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375
U.S. 411 (1964); the Prentis doctrine, see Prentis v. Atlanta Coast Line Co., 211 U.S.
210 (1908); comity principles in injunctions against state prosecution, see Younger v.
Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
117
Even the first exception would also seem to be constitutionally required where
the cause of action is based on federal law or where the authority challenged is set by
federal law. See Gunther, supra note 184, at 16.
'"See Race Quotas, supra note 6, at 141-46 (1973) (giving a history of the school
desegregation cases).
119
396 u.s. 346 (1970).
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would be sufficient to prove continuing discrimination, the plaintiffs
asked for but were refused more specific relief. The Supreme Court
reversed, stating that any relief that failed to end the discrimination
would require further .. corrective action by a federal court charged
with the responsibility of enforcing constitutional guarantees." 190
The Court, therefor~, is constitutionally obligated not only to
hear and determine the constitutional issues properly brought before
it but is also under a collary duty to provide the relief necessary to
redress the prevailing party's constitutional rights. Any refusal to
provide relief, other than on the usual equitable grounds,l 91 must
therefore arise out of the Court's appreciation that the power to take
remedial action is constitutionally committed to another branch of
government.
2. Executive and Congressional Powers

Notwithstanding the separation of powers, Congress and the
executive typically act in concert, with the first formulating the laws
and the second executing them. This interplay of presidential and
congressional power was analyzed in Justice Jackson's concurring
opinion in the Steel Seizure Case! 92 The gist of Justice Jackson's
argument is that the President's powers are derived from two
sources, his own inherent constitutionally allotted powers and those
powers conferred upon him by Congress in his capacity as the
executor of the nation's general laws. Congress in turn has its own
powers conferred by the Constitution. When exercised in the absence
of inherent presidential power, these congressional powers properly
direct and control the executive's actions. 193
Of course, in most instances Congress and the President work
together in carrying out their constitutional roles. 194 This legislative90
'
/d. at 359.
'" Seep. 367 infra.
"'Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634-55 (1952).
Equitable considerations which limited relief by referring to the parties' respective
situations would not be considered self-limitations by the Court. Seep. 363 infra.
'"See 343 U.S. at 635-37.
••• In the great majority of these situations, the executive branch acts in some
administrative manner and that ends the matter. Presidential enforcement of
congressional directives usually produces no involvement with the judiciary unless
Congress has directed the President to use judicial process to enforce the law, e.g.•
Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145 (1965), or a private citizen seeks judicial
process to insure that members of the executive branch enforce the law as Congress
directed, e.g., Kendall v. United States, 37 U.S., (12 Pet.) 524 (1838).
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executive interplay may obscure the essential constitutional reality
concerning the President's power: he often acts not from his own
constitutional power as a decisionmaker but from the discretion and
power that Congress has given him. 195 Indeed, an attack on the
constitutionality of executive action in enforcing statutes always
resolves itself into the question not whether the executive had
constitutional power to act but whether Congress had such power. 196
The Larson-Dugan ultra vires exception to sovereign immunity
thus preserves Congress' control over executive authority in the areas
where the President's powers derive from his role as executor of
Congress' laws. The ultra vires exception forbids the defendant
official to claim immunity for actions that are outside the scope of
the authority Congress has given him, thus effectively forcing the
executive branch to conform its actions to Congress' legislated
wishes. 197
Similarly, situations not covered by the Larson-Dugan
exceptions may be seen as areas where the judiciary, lacking any
article III interest of its own to assert, 198 defers to the joint power of
m See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 630-31 (1952)
(Douglas, J., concurring); Wilbur v. United States ex rei. Kadrie, 281 U.S. 206 (1930);
United States ex ref. Hall v. Payne, 254 U.S. 343 (1920). Occasionally it is suggested
that Congress gives too much discretion to the President. Compare Schechter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), with Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414
(1944).
196
See, e.g.. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Afroyim v. Rusk, 387
U.S. 253 (1967); cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634-55
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). But see Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969)
(congressional employees).
The President has his own constitutional powers as well, U.S. CONST. art. II,§ 2,
chiefly relating to foreign relations and control of the armed forces. The. powers
el'plicitly granted are actually quite meager and often also require the consent of the
Senate. But the el'plicit powers conferred have often served as the focal point for
greater implied powers. See, e.g., United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); United
States v. Curtiss-Wright El'port Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936). The power implied may
become so wide as to create friction with the powers of other branches of government.
See, e.g., United States v. Nil'on, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); Note, Congress, the President,
and the Power to Commit Forces to Combat, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1771 (1968). This
aspect of the President's inherent power will be considered at pp. 360-63 infra in the
section dealing with sovereign immunity and relief.
197 See Houston v. Ormes, 252 U.S. 469, 472-74 (1920); Minnesota v. Hitchcock,
185 U.S. 373 (1902) (injunction to control abuse of discretion granted; no sovereign
immunity). The parallel between the mandamus and sovereign immunity doctrines is
discussed exhaustively in Clackamas County v. McKay, 219 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir.
1954), vacated as moot 349 U.S. 909 (1955).
191
See pp. 354-57 supra.
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Congress and President. Thus applied, sovereign immunity protects
the full range of federal lawmaking power from challenge as long as
that power is exercised within constitutional bounds. 199 Even the
Court's practice of strictly construing putative waivers of sovereign
immunity ensures that it will play no role in this area except as
prescribed by Congress. 200
Seen in this light, the Larson Court's rejection of the "mere
illegality" exception to sovereign immunity201 becomes an important
decision Of constitutional law not unlike those rendered by a
chastised Court after 1937. Cases such as Wickard v. Filburn 202 and
Steward Machine Co. v. Davis203 marked the end of the Court's
predilection for judging statutes by the Justices' own sense of a
higher generallaw. 204 Similarly, since the "mere illegality" exception
was based on finding official violations of general tort law, rejection
of that exception took the Court out of the business of finding
"general law" and left it to Congress to decide what national policies
should be pursued. 205
The Larson-Dugan exceptions, therefore, operate at a level of
analysis where the constitutional powers of the three branches of
government are easily accommodated. The judiciary carries out its
primary role of interpreting and applying the Constitution while
deferring to congressional and executive power to make and apply
general law, to exercise unreviewable lawmaking power in all the
range of issues permitted by the Constitution. Furthermore, at this
199
Since Congress' authority is defined by the Constitution, the only challenge to
congressional authority can be on constitutional grounds. The judiciary has no power
to inquire into Congress' discretionary, decisionmaking. Cf Powell v. McCormack,
395 u.s. 486 (1969).
200
See United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584,590 (1941); cf. Canadian Aviator
Ltd. v. United States, 324 U.S. 215, 222 (1945). See generally HART & WECHSLER,
supra note 4, at 1351-56.
201
See Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. at 699-702. The
exception had been employed earlier in Goltra v. Weeks, 271 U.S. 536 (1926).
202
317 U.S. Ill (1942).
20
' 301 u.s. 548 (1937).
204
See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 {1905); Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261
U.S. 525 (1923). For a contemporary historical account of the Court's assumption of
these general review powers, see Jacobson, Federalism and Property Rights, 15
N.Y.U.L.Q. REV. 319 (1938).
20
' The Court's role in making general law is now interstitial, filling in gaps left in
legislation, either by necessity or by congressional directive. See Textile Workers
Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957); HART & WECHSLER, supra note 4, at
762-69, 800-06, 830-32. In no manner does the Court displace congressional decisions
in this area as it did before 1937.
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general level the ultra vires exception to sovereign immunity also
coordinates the roles between the executive and Congress, insuring
that Congress' directives are obeyed when the executive strays from
its authority, yet allowing full executive discretion when the executive
is acting within its authority. The judiciary itself plays no role in the
lawmaking and enforcement process except to the extent allowed by
statute. 206

B. Separation of Powers in the Relief Context
As seen above, the Larson-Dugan exceptions operate to confine
each branch of government to its constitutional area of responsibility. In the relief context, however, the Supreme Court's power to
decide constitutional issues and to provide relief can conflict with an
equally explicit exclusive constitutional power of another branch to
deal with the subject matter of the Court's proposed relief order. It is
precisely such a conflict that is at the heart of the warning against
affirmative relief in Larson's famous footnote eleven.

1. General Considerations
The Larson footnote cited a single authority/ 07 but it was only
one of several old cases in which plaintiffs' requested relief would
have compelled an officer to perform a basic legislative function such
as levying a tax 208 or appropriating government land to private
parties. 209 Indeed, the Court went so far as to divide land cases into
two classes: those where the defendant officer claimed title without
right and those where he claimed title by virtue of legislative act.
Those cases seeking relief against the legislative act were held barred
by sovereign immunity. 210
,.,. E.g., in enforcing statutorily ,created causes of action, in creating federal
common law when invited to do so by Congress or to flesh out Congressional policies.
See, e.g., Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957); note 55 supra.
It should also be noted here that the accommodation of powers discussed in the text
above is not an abstract and logical meshing of powers but rather a compromise
worked out and accepted over time as a necessary consequence of the Court's
assumption of the power of constitutional interpretation in Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S, (I Crnnch) 137 (1803).
207
337 U.S. at 691 n.l1, citing North Carolina v. Temple, 134 U.S. 22 (1890).
"'E.g., North Carolina v. Temple, 134 U.S. 22 (1890).
109 E.g., Cunningham v. Macon & B.R.R., 109 U.S. 446 (1883); see Larson v.
Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 713-15 (1949) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
210 See, e.g., Noble v. Union R.L.R.R., 147 U.S. 165 (1893) (government claim to
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The Court's unwillingness to infringe on legislative functions in
the state context is evident in the Court's recent decision in Edelman
v. Jordan. 211 Allowing future relief could be justified on the theory
that the legislature was free to decide whether to pay or discontinue a
program; retroactive relief was barred because it left no decision to
the legislature. 212
2. The Test

At the relief stage of litigation the court has before it a precise
governmental action which the plaintiff wants undertaken, and the
issue, under the separation of powers analysis, is whether the
judiciary is the branch of government which may make that remedial
decision or whether the Constitution commits the decision on that
narrow issue to some other branch. More precisely, we noted above
that in cases where the Larson-Dugan exceptions allowed it to act, the
judiciary is performing its own constitutionally mandated function of
interpreting and enforcing the Constitution.213 The narrow question
at the relief stage becomes whether that general power is negated by
the Constitution's specific grant of authority to another branch to
decide the issue raised in the proposed relief decree. 214
land based only on official's ultra vires act; railroad deemed to hold title by
congressional authorization and relief giving it title granted); Cunningham v. Macon
& B.R.R., 109 U.S. 446 (1883) (state sovereign immunity context; relief denied where
state by legislative act maintained title in land). For a modern example of a court
trying to come to grips with the issue, compare the majority and dissenting opinions in
Simons v. Vinson, 394 F.2d 732 (5th Cir. 1968) (suit to establish title in land).
The cases are collected in Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U.S. 643, 646 nn.6, 7 (1962).
Malone did not reach the question ofrelief since the plaintiffs failed to clear the initial
hurdle of showing the Larson-Dugan exceptions tp be applicable. /d. at 646-48.
211 415 U.S. 651 (1974). See pp. 346-47 supra.
212
/d. at 666-69 and n.ll. Of course, the state legislature in Edelman was not one
of the three branches of the federal government. But the states are in a real sense
situated, in relation to the Court's review power, no differently from the coordinate
branches of the federal government. The Court has therefore adopted comity
principles which give the same respect to state institutions as the Court would grant to
the federal branches of government under a separation of powers analysis. See Mayor
v. Educational Equality League, 415 U.S. 605,615 (1974).
213
See pp. 353-60 supra. It was noted, moreover, thai the exceptions work in such
a manner that the court plays its role in constitutional interpretation while not
interfering with the general power of the legislative and executive branches to make
and enforce law at their discretion in all of the area allotted to the federal government
by the Constitution.
214
This is the inquiry adopted in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), for deciding
separation of power issues.
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The inquiry therefore begins with the Constitution's text. Where
power to decide the issue is explicitly conferred by the Constitution
on another branch of government, as with the President's pardoning
power, 215 that apparently ends the inquiry. 216 But, as we noted
earlier, 217 the powers of each branch of government have been
expanded through recognition of implied and inherent powers, and
therefore the Court will be faced in most cases with the task of
determining the scope of the power implied from the Constitution's
text. 218 If the Court is unable to find the matter explicitly committed
to another branch, it may employ a variety of inquiries into the
strength of its own power, any lack of power being taken as a sign
that the power to decide lies with another branch. 219
If one approaches the sovereign immunity issue from this
perspective, it becomes immediately clear why treasury-opening
decisions, such as that in Edelman v. Jordan, 220 activate the immunity
defense, while decrees like that in Train v. City of New York,m which
ordered the release of impounded funds, do not bother the Court. 222
The separation of powers approach deals not with notions of
"sovereign" powers but with the specific powers of the other
branches of government. Payment from the treasury implicates the
power of the legislative branch, 223 which by specific constitutional
mandate possesses the exclusive power to raise the money needed by
m See U.S. CONST. art. II,§ 2.
See, e.g., ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866).
'"See pp. 354-60 supra.
211 See, e.g.. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486,518-48 (1969).
219 See id. at 517-18, 548-49; Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,211-26 (1962). The Court
also asks, for example, whether the relief at issue is subject to "judicially manageable
standards." !d. at 226. The lack of such standards might convince the Court that the
issue, narrowly drawn, is constitutionally allotted to the Court as much as to another
branch. Compare Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946) (guaranty clause puts
reapportionment issue before Congress), with Baker v. Carr, supra, at 226 (judicially
manageable standards under equal protection clause give power over same issue to
the Court).
210 415 U.S. 651 (1974). The Court has faced the same issue with regard to federal
defendants. See Mine Safety Appliances Co. v. Forrestal, 326 U.S. 371 (1945).
211
95 S. Ct. 839 (1975).
222 The issue is raised at p. 352 supra, in connection with our criticism of the
inductive logic test for judging whether relief would violate sovereign immunity.
111 Since the Edelman case deals with a state treasury, a separation of powers
analysis does not technically apply. However, the same approach is employed under
comity principles. See note 212 supra. For a federal sovereign immunity case
m
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government and determine how it .is to be spent. 224 Since the power to
pay out the nation's money rests with Congress, the Constitution, by
its separation of powers, prevents the Court from ordering payments
in cases such as Edelman. By the same reason the Court can order
relief in cases such as Train, for there Congress has already exercised
its constitutional power, having made the determination under
article I that the money should be paid out for a specified purpose. m
The separation of powers approach to the sovereign immunity
aspects of relief has one overarching benefit. Functionally it puts the
court in the role it knows and which it has since Marbury v. Madison
sought to play-that of interpreter of the Constitution. A voided are
such essentially political inquiries as whether relief would impose an
intolerable burden on government. 226 Certainly deciding if the
Constitution allots power on a given issue exclusively to one branch
or another is a difficult task; 227 but it is essentially the same job that
the Court undertakes whenever it decides the constitutionality of a
statute or executive policy. As the Court recently reiterated in United
States v. Nixon,
·oeciding whether a matter has in any measure been
committed by the Constitution to another branch of
government, or whether the action of that branch exceeds
whatever authority has been committed, is itself a delicate
exercise in constitutional interpretation, and is a responsibility of this Court as ultimate interpreter of the
Constitution.' 228

analogous to Edelman, see Mine Safety Appliances Co. v. Forrestal, 326 U.S. 371
(1945).
"'U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 7 (revenue bills originate in House),§ 8 (power to lay and
collect taxes, pay debts), § 9 ("No· Money shall be drawn from the Treasury but in
Consequence of Appropriations made by Law •..").
m See Train v. City of New York, 95 S. Ct. 839,843 (1975).
226
See pp. 348-51 supra.
227
This is especially true with the increasing assertion of "inherent," i.e., nontextual, constitutional powers. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683,703-07 (1974)
(executive privilege); Schlafly v. Volpe, 495 F.2d 273 (7th Cir. 1974) (asserted inherent
executive power to control spending by a fiscally irresponsible Congress).
228
418 U.S. at 704, quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962); cf. Powell v.
McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 520-21 (1969).
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C. Employment Discrimination Relief· Applying tHe Separation of
Powers Analysis

The separation of powers approach to deciding sovereign
immunity aspects of relief may be illustrated by consideration of the
federal employment discrimination problem. As was discussed in
Section I of this Article, the Larson-Dugan exceptions apply to claims
of unconstitutional discrimination in federal employment, thus
allowing the suits to be heard on the merits. 229 the question then
arises as to what kind of relief is within the court's power, and the
concern behind the question is possible interference with the
executive branch's control over government employment affairs. 230
The starting point is the separation of powers test: a constitutional
violation having taken place, the courts have the power and are
under the duty to remedy the violation unless such relief would
impinge upon a substantive power allocated by the Constitution
exclusively to the executive branch. 231
There are explicit presidential powers regarding the selection of
a certain level of government employees, for example, judges and
certain high officials. 232 With respect to executive officials, the power
carries with it an inherent presidential power to discharge them at his
pleasure. 233 Even if the President or his advisors discriminate at this
level, the Constitution might be read to assume that this cost is worth
the benefits to executive effectiveness. Similarly, the President and
his military officers might conclude that a war effort required
discriminatory decisionmaking in armed forces promotion practices.
That might be deemed within the President's power as Commanderin-Chief.234 Of course, we can only speculate here because the
presidential power, not being explicitly conferred by the Con219

See p. 343 supra.
See p. 347-48 supra. Relief involving back pay •would come within the
examples of congressional power of the purse discussed above. See pp. 362-63 supra.
Since there is an adequate remedy at law for the back pay claim, see Chambers v.
United States, 451 F.2d 1045 (Ct. Cl. 1971), Congress' having waived its sovereign
immunity interest in controlling the nation's purse, see id. and 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2)
(1970), the only remaining issue to be examined is that of injunctive relief.
m See pp. 361-62 supra.
m U.S. CONST. art. II,§ 2. Senate approval is required.
m See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926); Humphrey's Executor v.
United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935); Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958).
m U.S. CONST. art. II,§ 2; see Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
Cf. Ballard v. Schlesigner, 95 S. Ct. 572 (1975).
210
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stitution, would have to be delineated on a case by case inquiry into
the scope of the President's implied powers. 235
Whatever the extent of the implied presidential power with
regard to tenure of higher level officials, it seems clear that it could
not reach down to cover the general run of government employees.
The constitutional text extends the power of appointment only down
to "inferior officers" and that power itself comes to the President
only as directed by Congress.236 Thus, it appears that the power to
control the employment of even inferior officers is more in line with
the concept of the President's role as executor of Congress'
directives, rather than any exclusive power of his own.237 Moreover,
even granting an inherent power, it would take a strained
interpretation to bring all federal employees within the scope of the
term "inferior officers. " 238
The refusal to recognize such inherent presidential power over
federal employee tenure also accords with both our traditional and
recent practices concerning suits by federal employees. Traditionally
the Court shied away from involvement in employee suits, but it
founded its reluctance on equitable grounds because there was an
adequate post-removal remedy at law. 239 In recent years both the
courts240 and Congress241 have limited the executive's control over the
general mass of government employees. Indeed, the Court's most
recent_pronouncement on this issue in Sampson v. Murray, 242 while
refusing to grant interim relief in most circumstances, nevertheless
maintains the Court's shared power with Congress and the executive
to act in employee suits.243
"'See, e.g., cases cited in note 233 supra: Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210-26
(1962).
236
U.S. CONST. art. II,§ 2.
2
" See pp. 357-58 supra.
m Cf Morrow v. Crisler, 491 F.2d 1053, 1061 (5th Cir. 1974) (dissenting opinion)
(arguing, without success, that state troopers are "officers," rather than "employees,"
of the state).
239
See, e.g., White v. Berry, 171 U.S. 366 (1898). The more extreme reluctance of
earlier cases appears to derive from the elementary nature of statutory standards for
testing the legality of eStecutive dismissial of employees. See Keirn v. United States,
177 U.S. 290,293-94 (1900) (arguing that "in the absence of statutory regulation," the
President must be allowed discretion, else the employee is effectively tenured for life).
In Sampson v. Murrary, 415 U.S. 61, 72 (1974), the White line of cases was read only
for the narrow proposition that "interim injunction relieP' could not be granted to
control employee discharges.
240
See, e.g., Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363 (1957).
241
See Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 78-83 (1974) (describing the "broad
regulatory" structure Congress has created in the area of employee rights).
242
415 u.s. 61 (1974).
243
/d. at 92 n.68. Of course, were we to consider the power to discharge employees
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Moreover, in personnel matters any claimed right to discriminate runs counter to statutorily declared national policy244 and
executive orders issued by the President that forbid unconstitutional
discrimination in federal employment. 245 Any assertion that the
executive branch needs to control all underlings to insure that the
laws are faithfully executed is necessarily limited by these
declarations. Thus, discrimination by lower federaJ supervisory
personnel cannot be considered as an implementation of presidential
policy or power. 246
Nor can it be accepted that employee complaints are unsuited to
judicial resolution and thereby inferentially within the power of some
other branch. 247 Just as the Court found its equal protection
standards applicable in reapportionment suits/48 they are also
applicable in employment cases. 249 Indeed, the judiciary's vast
experience with employment cases insures its competence in these
matters. 250
In sum, then, injunctive relief in an employment discrimination
case cannot be seen as trenching on the exclusive domain of another
branch of government and thus should not be barred by sovereign
immunity principles. Although this analysis leaves little room for
governmental officials to shield their discriminatory personnel
decisions, it should be emphasized that a court would only order
such relief as would be constitutionally necessary. 251 Consequently, in
to be an inherent, exclusive executive power, then even congressional legislation would
be an intrusion upon that power and would therefore be unconstitutional. See Myers
v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926). In practice we have usually assumed that the ·
government needed congressional authority to justify executive regulations governing
employee rights. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101,7151-54,7301,7311,7321 (1970).
lU 5 u.s.c. § 7151 (1970).
115
See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 11246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12319 (1965), superseded in part
by Exec. Order No. 11478, 34 Fed. Reg. 12985 (1969).
'"See Service v, Dulles, 354 U.S. 363 (1957).
"'Seep. 262 and n.219 supra.
"'See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 226-37 (1962).
9
" Cf. Ballard v. Schlesinger, 95 S. Ct. 572 (1975); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411
u.s. 677 (1973).
0
" The cases decided under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (Supp. III, 1973) and other statutes
are too numerous to mention here, For a sampling see cases noted in 42 U.S.C.A. at
277-521 (1974). There is no reason to believe that the mastery of problem solving
techniques built up in this area cannot also be used in handling suits against federal
officials. Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(d) (Supp. III, 1973) (adopting same standards for
judicial decision in suits against feder~l officials as previously applied to private
employers).
211
See p. 266 supra.
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most situations such long-accepted remedies as reinstatement or
prohibitory relief might prove acceptable in ending the
discrimination. 252 Moreover, whatever interest the executive branch
has in running its own affairs would be vindicated through the
application of usual equity principles. 253
CONCLUSION

The reluctance of several federal courts to entertain federal
employee discrimination suits has led us to a general reexamination
of the doctrine on which the decisions were based-sovereign
immunity. Inherited from the English legal system, the doctrine has
survived, I suggest, because in its revised American formulation it
serves to maintain the separate constitutional powers of the three
branches of our federal government.
At one level of application the doctrine's rules are firmly
established, the Supreme Court having long recognized two
exceptions to sovereign immunity that in effect comprise the
doctrine. These exceptions, which the deviant federal employment
discrimination cases failed to follow, permit suits to be heard against
federal officials who have acted outside their statutory authority or
in an unconstitutional manner. Therefore, as later circuit court
decisions have held, suits alleging unconstitutional employment
practices by federal officials deserve a hearing on the merits.
Even though a case may be heard on the merits, relief may also
raise sovereign immunity problems. At the relief phase of litigation,
the Supreme Court has established no firm rules similar to the two
exceptions applied at the pleading stage of the suit. While claims for
money from the treasury or for title to public land are certain to raise
problems, it is unclear why such relief should be banned under the
rubric of sovereign immunity, and, accordingly, one can never be
quite certain what relief other than land and treasury claims would
252
Cf Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325 (1939). Only in cases where discrimination was
proved throughout a department or agency would more coercive relief be required.
The guiding standard for the court would be whether it could expect the defendant
officials to remedy their constitutional wrongs from their own affirmative action. See
Race Quotas, supra note 6, at 172.
"'E.g., mootness, see Liner v. Jafco, 375 U.S. 301 (1964); but see Southern Pacific
Terminal Co. v. I.C. C., 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911); existence of an adequate remedy at
law, see Chambers v. United States, 451 F.2d 1045 (Ct. Cl. 1971). One commentator
has argued that these traditional devices are completely adequate to keep in bounds
any feared flood of litigation. Block, supra note 35, at 1081-85.

368

Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review

[Vol. 10

be similarly barred. This Article has argued that separation of powers
notions underlie the Court's actions concerning relief, thus
suggesting a method of analysis that can give more objective content
to the term "sovereign immunity" at the relief stage of litigation.
Applying the separation of powers approach involves the courts
in a task they know well-constitutional interpretation, for the
courts must ask whether the relief they have been asked to grant
would invade powers committed exclusively to_ another branch of
government. In suits charging federal employment discrimination,
very few, if any, forms of injunctive relief would be forbidden
because the Constitution commits few powers to the President in this
regard.

